Rights of the Accused

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

— Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... 

— Fifth Amendment

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

— Sixth Amendment

Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... 

— Fourteenth Amendment

We normally think of a trial by jury as one of the individual rights afforded to persons accused of a crime. It is also, as we have seen, a right that is institutional as well—one that belongs to the people as a whole as well as to the individual. But jury trials, as has been all too evident in dictatorships, can be meaningless unless that trial is governed by rules that ensure fairness to the individual. A trial in which the judge allows illegally seized evidence to be used, or in which the defendant has no access to an attorney, is forced to testify against himself, or is denied the ability to bring witnesses favorable to his cause, is not a trial that meets the standard of due process of law. The men who drafted the Bill of Rights knew this, not only from their experience during the Colonial era, but also from the history of Great Britain, which ever since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 had been committed to expanding the rule of law.

Today we tend to emphasize the relationship of rights to individual liberty, but even those rights which are most identified as individual—such as the rights of persons accused of crimes—still have a community basis. Rights in American history are not designed to free the individual from community norms; rather, they exist to promote a
reasonable bail, the exclusion of confessions made out of
surprisingly modern list of rights, which included a right to
passed after the American Revolution of 1776, we find a
than in Great Britain. If we look at the first state laws
the rights of the accused had progressed much further
the procedures or the results of state trials. One should

regarding the rights of the accused, the basic outlines of
due process are spelled out in the Constitution, and their
specifics have been refined in local, state, and federal
courtrooms for more than two centuries. Many of these
questions seem to deal with minute, some would even say
mundane, details of procedure. But as Justice Felix
Frankfurter once declared, “The history of American free-
dom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”
His colleague on the Supreme Court, Justice Robert H.
Jackson, agreed, and once noted that whatever else “due
process” might mean, procedural fairness “is what it most
uncompromisingly requires.”

What is due process of law? There is no absolute agree-
ment on the meaning, and over the past two centuries
courts have found that the phrase encompasses not only
procedural but substantive rights as well. For our pur-
poses, due process of law is what the Constitution, as inter-
preted by the courts and supplemented by legislation, has
created to protect the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem. It does not mean that in every case every defendant is
treated identically. Rather, every defendant, no matter
what the charge, is entitled to certain processes to ensure
that at the end of the day, he or she will have had a fair
trial, conducted under the rules of law, openly, and in such
a manner that the public can rest assured that the system
is working fairly. While this sounds simple to accomplish,
the history of criminal procedure in the United States and
elsewhere shows that in most states, there were few
procedural rights, and even the ones that existed were not
stringently enforced. Searches could often be carried out
without a warrant; persons arrested could be subjected to
intimidating police interrogation without the presence of a
lawyer; if they did not have the money to hire an attorney,
then they could be tried without a lawyer; in many states
defendants did not have the right to refuse to testify at
their trials, and if they decided not to take the stand, their
silence could be used as “proof” of their guilt; and if found
guilty, they often did not have the right of an appeal.

Because the United States is a federal system, laws do
vary not only between the federal government and the
states, but from state to state. In those areas where the
Constitution does not spell out a clear federal supremacy,
the practice has been to allow the states great leeway in
how they conduct their business, including investigation
and prosecution for crime. Until the early 20th century,
federal courts operated on the assumption that the
Constitution did not give them any power to review either
the procedures or the results of state trials. One should
note that in many states, procedural guidelines were as
protective of individual rights as that of the federal govern-
ment. But a wide spectrum existed, ranging from trials that
would, under any circumstances, be considered fair to
those that could only be described as mockeries of justice.
It was one of these latter that finally moved the federal
courts to intervene, and which over the next half-century
led to a redefinition of criminal procedure in the
United States.
The most innocent man, pressed by the awful solemnities of public accusation and trial, may be incapable of supporting his own cause. He may be utterly unfit to cross-examine the witnesses against him, to point out the contradictions or defects of their testimony, and to counteract it by properly introducing it and applying his own.

The eight young black men (the “Scottsboro boys”) who were charged with raping two white girls in Alabama in 1931 may have been innocent, but in the racially charged atmosphere of the Deep South during the Depression they certainly had no knowledge or ability to defend themselves. All eight were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to die in sham trials lasting less than a day. The lawyers assigned to defend them by the judge did little more than show their faces in the courtroom and leave. When news of this travesty of justice reached northern newspapers, civil liberties groups immediately volunteered to provide effective counsel on appeal, and succeeded in moving the case into the federal court system and up to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Although the justices were appalled at what had passed for a fair trial, they did not base their opinion on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, but rather on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The whole episode had been a mockery of justice, and while the Court focused on the absence of counsel, the real problem was that without an attorney to represent the defendant, there cannot be a fair trial, and there cannot be due process of law.

The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be out on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.

The case of Powell v. Alabama is notable for two things. First, it launched the federal courts on a new mission, that of overseeing the criminal justice system in the states, and they did this under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically applies to the states. It was not then, and never has been, the mission of the federal courts to ensure that criminal procedure in every state is identical to that in every other state. Rather, the courts have attempted to define the minimum protection of rights that the Constitution demands to ensure due process. While some states, for example, have 12-person juries, other states have lesser numbers for certain types of trial. These variations are permissible, the courts have held, so long as the trial and the jury adhere to minimal standards of fairness.

Second, Powell established the rule that in capital cases, those in which the death penalty could be imposed, effective assistance of counsel is constitutionally required. The lawyers in the Alabama case did no more than show up; they did nothing to defend their clients, and for all practical purposes might as well have been absent altogether. Not only must a defendant have a lawyer, the Court ruled, but that lawyer must provide real assistance, or as the courts have put it, effective counsel.

But the Court that ruled in Powell still believed strongly in a federal system, and while it was willing to extend its oversight function, it did so slowly, and only when confronted with a case that so offended it that the justices could
not ignore the breach of due process. In 1936, for example, the high court overturned the convictions of three black men who had confessed to committing murder only after they had been severely beaten and tortured. In Brown v. Mississippi (1936), Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes denounced the state’s use of coerced confessions as a violation of due process. Torture “revolted the sense of justice,” and violated a principle “so rooted in the traditions and consciences of our people as to be ranked fundamental.”

Here again the Court was not ready to extend the protection of explicit Bill of Rights guarantees, but relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It made clear that states had great leeway in how they structured their trials; they did not even have to have jury trials provided whatever procedure they did adopt conformed to the principles of fairness demanded by the ideal of due process.

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in Brown v. Mississippi 1936

Because a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness chair.

Although Powell established the rule that states had to provide counsel in capital cases. It did not address the question of whether counsel had to be provided to indigent defendants in felony cases that did not carry the death penalty. That issue would not be decided in the United States until 1963, in one of the most famous cases in American history—Gideon v. Wainwright.

A drifter, Clarence Earl Gideon, had been convicted of robbing a pool hall. At his trial he maintained his innocence, and asked the judge to assign him a lawyer, since he believed the Constitution of the United States assured him of that right. The judge responded that under Florida law he was not entitled to a lawyer in this case. Gideon did the best job he could defending himself, but was found guilty primarily on the basis of circumstantial evidence. In prison he went to the library and looked up how to appeal his case, first to the Florida Supreme Court (which turned him down), and then to the U.S. Supreme Court.

As it turned out, Gideon’s “pauper’s appeal” (in forma pauperis) arrived at the Court in the midst of the “due process revolution” of the Warren Court. The Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was in the process of determining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also “incorporates” other elements of due process found in the Bill of Rights. The Court had not yet determined whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was to be incorporated, and Gideon’s appeal gave it the opportunity to make that decision. And as it does whenever it accepts a pauper’s appeal, the Court assigned counsel to represent Gideon, in this case one of Washington’s most prominent attorneys, Abe Fortas, later to be a member of the Court itself. (Law firms consider it a high honor when asked by the Court to do this type of service, even though they are not reimbursed a cent for the thousands of dollars they expend in preparing the case.)

At oral argument, Fortas convinced the justices that there could never be a truly fair trial, and that the requirement of due process could never be met, unless a defendant, no matter what his or her financial resources, could have the services of an attorney. The Court agreed, and in its decision extended this basic right to all persons charged with a felony. A few years later, the Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger, extended this protection to misdemeanor charges that could lead to a jail sentence.
Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy
on the Gideon case

1963

If an obscure Florida convict named Clarence Earl Gideon had not sat down in his prison cell with a pencil and paper to write a letter to the Supreme Court, and if the Court had not taken the trouble to look for merit in that one crude petition among all the bundles of mail it must receive every day, the vast machinery of American law would have gone on functioning undisturbed.

But Gideon did write that letter, the Court did look into his case; he was retried with the help of a competent defense counsel, found not guilty, and released from prison after two years of punishment for a crime he did not commit—and the whole course of American legal history has been changed.

The role of the lawyer is considered central to protecting the rights of a person accused of a crime, but the lawyer standing alone would be of little use were it not for the bundle of codified rights that are there for the accused person’s protection. What evidence may be used in a criminal case, for example, is governed by the protections against unlawful search and seizure established in the Fourth Amendment. Here again the colonists’ experience under British rule in the 18th century shaped the concerns of the Founding generation.

Although British law required that warrants be issued for the police to search a person’s residence, the British Colonial government relied on general warrants, called writs of assistance, which gave officials a license to search almost everywhere for almost everything. The notion of a general warrant dated back to the Tudor reign under Henry VIII, and resistance to its broad reach began to grow in the early 18th century. Critics attacked the general warrants as "a badge of slavery upon the whole people, exposing every man’s house to be entered into, and searched by persons unknown to him.” But the government still used them, and they became a major source of friction between His Majesty’s Government and the American colonists. The problem with the general warrant was that it lacked specificity. In England in 1763, for example, a typical warrant issued by the Secretary of State commanded “diligent search” for the unidentified author, printer, and publisher of a satirical journal, The North Briton, and the seizure of their papers. At least five houses were subsequently searched, 49 (mostly innocent) people were arrested, and thousands of books and papers confiscated. Opposition to the warrants was widespread in England, and the opposition gradually forced the government to restrict their usage.

Chief Justice Sir Charles Pratt, on general warrants

1762

To enter a man’s house by virtue of a nameless warrant in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; [it is] a law under which no Englishman would wish to live for an hour.

Despite its restriction in the mother country, the use of general warrants remained widespread in the colonies, and constituted one of the colonists’ major complaints against Great Britain. In a famous speech against the writs of assistance, James Otis, a member of the colonial Massachusetts assembly, charged that they went “against the fundamental principles of law, the privilege of house…. [It is] the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, that was ever found in an English law-book.” Following the Revolution, the states enacted a variety of laws limiting the use of such warrants, and when James Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment spelled out further restrictions on the use of warrants.

In order to get a warrant under the U.S. Constitution, police must present evidence in their possession pointing to a specific person they wish to arrest or a place they wish to search. And they must be specific. The person must be identified by name, not just “the man who lives in that house.” Police must specify what it is they are searching for—contraband, drugs, weapons—and not just indicate that they wish to search a suspected person’s house. In order to get that warrant, they must have what the Fourth Amendment identifies as “probable cause.” This does not
mean overwhelming proof that there is contraband in a certain house or that a particular person did in fact commit a crime. Rather, they must show that it is more likely than not that the person did commit a specific illegal act, and that it is more likely than not that a search of the premises will yield particular evidence of a crime.

The Fourth Amendment is silent about any enforcement of these provisions, and for many years police in the states often did, in fact, search houses and arrest people either without having any warrant at all or having secured one without really showing probable cause. Courts held that federal law enforcement officials had to abide by the high standards of the Constitution, and created what came to be known as the “exclusionary rule.” Under this standard, evidence seized without a proper warrant could not be introduced at a trial. When the federal courts expanded the reach of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states as well, they also applied the exclusionary rule to state police and trial courts.

Justice Tom Clark, in Mapp v. Ohio 1961

[Without the exclusionary rule] the assurance against unreasonable searches would be “a form of words,” valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties. So too, without that rule the freedom from state invasion of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”

Although there have been some critics of the exclusionary rule—Justice Cardozo once famously said that because of the rule “the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered”—there is also general agreement that it is the only means to enforce the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It makes sure that the state, with all the power behind it, plays by the rules. And if it doesn’t, then it cannot use evidence illegally gained in prosecuting a person, even if that person is in fact guilty. While this may seem extreme to some, it serves a higher good—ensuring the proper behavior of the police.

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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is also often tied to what some scholars have called “the Great Right” in the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a “witness against himself.” The origins of the right go back to objections against the inquisitorial proceedings of medieval ecclesiastical tribunals as well as the British Courts of Star Chamber. By the late 17th century, the maxim of nemo tenetur prodere seipsum—no man is bound to accuse himself—had been adopted by British common law courts and had been expanded to mean that a person did not have to answer any questions about his or her actions. The state could prosecute a person, but could not require that he or she assist in that process. The colonies carried