GLOBAL ISSUES

THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION

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The World Bank defines globalization as “the growing integration of economies and societies around the world.” Wikipedia, the Internet encyclopedia, describes globalization as “the changes in societies and the world economy that result from dramatically increased international trade and cultural exchange.” The British magazine The Economist recently likened globalization to a line from a John Lennon song, “Imagine there’s no countries. It isn’t hard to do.” Clearly, globalization means different things to different people.

In this issue we consider these and other aspects of globalization. The experts we have chosen examine the topic from a variety of angles, yet we offer no prescriptions, no definitive answers: Our goal is for our readers to come away with a better understanding of a deep-seated, complex phenomenon that affects us all.

We begin with an exchange on where globalization is headed. Journalist James Glassman moderates the discussion between Venezuelan economist Moisés Naim and American trade expert Claude Barfield. These two knowledgeable observers delve into everything from whether globalization helps more people than it harms to its effect on religious attitudes. Next Josette Shiner, under secretary of state for economic, business, and agricultural affairs, explains the connection between liberal trade policies and a country’s economic growth rate. This section closes with an interview with Daniel Pink, author of two recent influential books, Free Agent Nation and A Whole New Mind. Pink theorizes that globalization is changing the way we work and even the way we think.

The next section takes up a hotly debated question—the effect of American popular culture on the local cultures of countries around the world. University of Texas professor Richard Pells makes the case that American culture itself is a stew of foreign influences, that it is in a sense really world culture. German professor Jessica Gienow-Hecht answers with an analysis of how various foreign intellectuals and officials have perceived American culture over the years. A photo gallery highlights current pop musicians, film stars, and athletes from around the world.

The journal’s last section considers the new threats and new opportunities raised by globalization. Daniel Griswold, of the Cato Institute, finds a connection between economic progress and a growth in freedom, human rights, and democracy in countries most affected by globalization. Louise Shelley, a professor of international relations at American University, examines a downside of globalization—the way more open borders and high tech can also make life easier for criminal and terrorist networks. Public health expert Dr. Donald Henderson reflects on the threat posed by global pandemics in an age when people and viruses can jet around the world in hours. A sidebar points out a positive side of the “global village” effect—how communications make possible better cooperation among nations after a natural catastrophe like the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Professor Stephen P. Heyneman, of Vanderbilt University, considers the common ambitions of colleges and universities in many countries.

One indisputable point through all the discussions is that globalization is here to stay. “There are all sorts of like-minded groups, interest groups, people that share interests, passions, technologies, hobbies, who get together across borders and create virtual communities that … develop all sorts of new political dynamics,” says Moisés Naim about the Internet. “That is irreversible. The prior waves of globalization were institutional, were commercial, where the central actors were trading companies. Today there is a globalization of individuals, and that is a very important difference.”
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In the year 2000 the International Monetary Fund published an *Issues Brief* with the evocative title “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?” IMF staff described globalization as “a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows.”

It’s true that many people think of a liberalized approach to trade when they consider globalization, and in recent years economic effects have come to dominate discussion of this phenomenon. But there is also a powerful psychological dimension to globalization.

Media analyst Marshall McLuhan coined the famous phrase “global village” in the 1960s, describing a profound cultural shift in a world where radio waves connected all parts of the planet. Long before the wired world we live in, McLuhan analyzed advances in communications technology that disrupted both traditional and modern societies.

Many scholars have analyzed the topic further. Arjun Appadurai, the Indian anthropologist who is now provost of the New School for Social Research in New York City, sees globalization as “the name of a new industrial revolution (driven by powerful new information and communication technologies) which has barely begun. Because of its newness, it taxes our linguistic and political resources for understanding and managing it.” Appadurai classifies five kinds of interconnectivity that characterize globalization: cross-border movements of people, money, ideas, media images, and technologies.

Where people disagree about globalization—often passionately—is in whether its effects are mostly good or mostly bad. As the World Bank’s Web site puts it, globalization “has been one of the most hotly debated topics in international economics over the past few years. Rapid growth and poverty reduction in China, India, and other countries that were poor 20 years ago, has been a positive aspect of globalization. But globalization has also generated significant international opposition over concerns that it has increased inequality and environmental degradation.”

Economic globalization often appears to be a kind of race, with real winners and losers. “Globalization offers extensive opportunities for truly worldwide development but it is not progressing evenly,” in the words of the IMF *Issues Brief*. “Some countries are becoming integrated into the global economy more quickly than others. Countries that have been able to integrate are seeing faster growth and reduced poverty.”

“In the United States and in the 10 or so most wealthy countries of the world,” says Appadurai, “globalization is certainly a positive buzz word for corporate elites and their political allies. But for migrants, people of color, and other marginals (the so-called ‘South’
in the ‘North’), it is a source of worry about inclusion, jobs, and deeper marginalization.”

But globalization also inspires considerable anxiety in the United States and other parts of the developed world when it takes the form of outsourcing—the movement of factory and service work to countries with lower wages.

The British economist Phillipe Legrain, by contrast, recently pointed out the cultural benefits of globalization. “The beauty of globalization,” Legrain writes, “is that it can free people from the tyranny of geography. Just because someone was born in France does not mean they can only aspire to speak French, eat French food, read French books, visit museums in France, and so on. A Frenchman—or an American, for that matter—can take holidays in Spain or Florida, eat sushi or spaghetti for dinner, drink Coke or Chilean wine, watch a Hollywood blockbuster or an Almodovar, listen to bhangra or rap, practice yoga or kickboxing, read Elle or The Economist, and have friends from all over the world.”

New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman is also in the optimist camp about globalization’s effects. According to his recent best-selling book, The World Is Flat, new Internet-based technologies mean that work can be moved anywhere in the world in search of expertise and low labor costs. Creative collaboration is enhanced. Doctors in Bangalore, India, are reading the x-rays of American patients as they sleep—a development that benefits both nations in Friedman’s view. To use the metaphor he favors, the playing field of economic competition has been leveled.

Even for Friedman, however, globalization has its disquieting elements. “The flattened world means we are connecting all the knowledge centers on the planet together into a single global network which—if politics and terrorists do not get in the way—could usher in a new era of prosperity and innovation,” he writes. “But contemplating the flat world also left me filled with dread … my personal dread derived from the obvious fact that it’s not only the software writers and computer geeks who get empowered to collaborate in a flat world. It’s also al-Qaida and other terrorist networks. The playing field is not being leveled only in ways that draw in and superempower a whole new group of innovators. It’s being leveled in a way that draws in a whole new group of angry, frustrated, and humiliated men and women.”

Claude Smadja and Klaus Schwab, two founders of the World Economic Forum, the Swiss-based foundation that brings business and government leaders together to improve the state of the world, have summed up the primary challenge globalization faces. “At a time when the emphasis is on empowering people, on democracy moving ahead all over the world, on people asserting control over their own lives, globalization has established the supremacy of the market in an unprecedented way,” they wrote in 1999. “We must demonstrate that globalization is not just a code word for an exclusive focus on shareholder value at the expense of any other consideration; that the free flow of goods and capital does not develop to the detriment of the most vulnerable segments of the population and of some accepted social and human standards. … If we do not invent ways to make globalization more inclusive, we have to face the prospect of a resurgence of the acute social confrontations of the past, magnified at the international level.”

George Clack
Senior Editor
We convened three experts for a discussion of globalization and its discontents.

Our discussion moderator, James Glassman, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is a former editor, publisher, and Washington Post columnist who now hosts the Web site TCSDaily.com, which concentrates on the connection between high tech and public policy. Moisés Naím, currently the editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine, is a Venezuelan economist who has served as a World Bank official and as minister of trade and industry for Venezuela in the 1990s. His just-published book is Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy. Claude Barfield is a trade expert, former consultant to the U.S. Trade Representative, and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization. He is currently writing a book about China.

While many see globalization as a recent development, our experts explain that it is a phenomenon that has been going on for a long time, in a variety of forms, virtually since people of one nation began trading with those of another. In fact, the period from the 1870s until the First World War, a time of tremendous change in transportation and communication, was once seen as a golden age of globalization. The wide-ranging discussion that follows also touches on recent changes in China and Eastern Europe, the future of the nation-state, counterfeiting and other forms of illicit trade, how globalization affects the developing world, its connection to a resurgence in religious fervor, and globalization’s effect on both democracy and dictators.

Glassman: Let’s start with a basic question. What is globalization?

Barfield: Well, everybody has a different definition, I suppose, but in the terms that I am comfortable with, I think it is the impact of changing technology on individual countries, individual societies over time. And I think globalization is very much technology-based. The tighter-knit globalization we are experiencing today would be impossible without the breakthrough over the past several decades in transportation efficiency (just-in-time manufacturing and delivery), underpinned by the communications revolution that now allows for instant
messaging to individuals and organizations all around the world.

Glassman: Is this a new phenomenon?

Barfield: No, I think you can go back to the Greeks. Any time you've got commerce among different nations or different societies, you're beginning to have globalization because what you're having are ideas, movements, transactions—commercial transactions—between different peoples. And that's the beginning, as it were, of globalization. You're not in an isolated, human community that has no other contact.

Glassman: So you're defining it in terms of trade?

Barfield: Well, I'm trying to define it in terms of societal contexts as well as trade. The two most recent periods that people look at are the late 19th and early 20th century, from roughly the 1870s to the First World War, where you had technology changes in transportation and communication, you had a knitting together of what we would call the developed world very, very closely, in fact more closely than the developed world is today. And some people look back on that as a golden age, as it were, of globalization. And then you could just pick up gradually after 1945 the gathering force in the '70s and '80s into the '90s, where you really have this burst of new technologies in terms of instant communication and very quick travel.

I think public policy certainly can have an impact on globalization. If one looks at the policies after 1920-21 in the United States, and then after the Depression began in the early '30s in Europe and the United States, as well as those countries like Argentina—which was quite advanced at that point—all of those countries had policies that we would call autarkical [aimed at creating self-sufficiency or economic independence]. They drew back into themselves. They cut trade and cut investment.

Glassman: So these “autarkical” countries—are there any significant ones that are left?

Barfield: You could take North Korea as the obvious example today, but even that is breaking down. So that I think you had autarkical systems that the Soviets set up in Eastern Europe with internal policies where you didn't really have much trade.

Glassman: Some people say that globalization is an American idea, that the rest of the world is adopting an American concept. Is that accurate?

Barfield: Only to the extent that I think the United States, given its position as the 20th century evolved, was always on the cutting edge of technology. And that was true even during the Depression.

Glassman: What are the benefits of globalization?

Barfield: I think the main benefits are the ability to consume better goods and better products at cheaper prices, to have a better quality of life. That begins in economics, but it doesn't end there, because people have other goals in their lives besides just economic goals. But I think that globalization is a means by which they can reach those other personal and national and societal ends.

Glassman: Moisés, in your new book Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy, you talk about globalization in terms of not just technological, but also political, change: “One major change that this most recent wave of globalization often brings to mind is the revolution in politics, as deep and transformational as the one in technology.” Tell us, this revolution in politics, was this caused by the revolution in technology or the revolution in communications? How has this happened?

Naím: I don't think we know. All we know is that it happened at the same time, and there is a very good, solid case to say that the more information people have, the more free they are to learn how others live. That has
created strong incentives for them also to strive and fight for freedom. And so there is a connection between new communication and transportation technologies and the political revolutions of the 1990s that opened borders and created a wave of democratization. It’s going to be very hard to really decide on causality, but it doesn’t matter. All we know is that these two things converged, and I think it’s very important.

One of the things I try to do in the book is to decouple the very common association between globalization and trade, or globalization and investment, or globalization and economics. I think it’s very important that we understand that the world now is connected in ways that go beyond economics, and beyond trade. You know 9/11 is an example of globalization. The attack on the World Trade Center was driven by political turmoil on the other side of the world. The terrorists relied upon the tools and technologies of globalization. They also took advantage of the opportunities created by more open borders due to the political changes.

**Barfield:** I agree with that. And I’m not sure what the dimensions were of the political revolution. But I do have a cautionary note. And this is a puzzle that we will have to work out in the next years, not just we, but all nations. With globalization you get technology coming over the borders, and governments not having as much control over their populations as they did, but the nation-state is still the only focus of democratic legitimacy. There is no democracy above the nation-state. It may be at some point you could have it. But you’ve got to work at this with the approach of what is possible, or what is legitimate for a nation to do, and what it should give up. And we argue about that. I mean the U.S. administration’s position on the International Criminal Court, or what powers we should give to the United Nations, or the World Trade Organization for that matter.

**Glassman:** A lot of people have said that with globalization technology, the nation-state would wither away. Now, maybe it’s a little early to see it withering away, but do you think that’s going to happen?

**Naím:** No. And I do agree that the nation-state is a core, central organizing element of the international system. There is a lot of discussion about the withered nation-state, and I frankly think that’s a silly conversation. I think the nation-state is going to be with us for a long time. What is happening is that nation-states are being transformed by globalization, are being transformed by the liberal politics inherent in the new technologies. And the constraints on nation-states are narrower and tighter than in the past. You talk to any head of state today, even those that exercise the role of an authoritarian government, and they will tell you that they’re very limited, or more limited than in the past.

**Glassman:** So what kind of constraints? Is it that the population has more contact with the outside world, or is [it] also [the] flow of capital into countries?

**Naím:** All of that. Authoritarian leaders have to contend with bond markets and international financial systems that constrain their economic choices. They have all sorts of trade constraints and possibilities. But also they have international standards. They cannot torture as freely and as openly as in the past. It happens, and it continues to happen. But one interesting change we now have as a result of globalization and the changes of the ’90s, is that dictators no longer sleep as easily at night as before. Dictators don’t always now go from the presidential palace to houses and villas on the Riviera. They may end up like Milosevic on trial.

**Glassman:** I’d like to talk about the downside of globalization since Claude had earlier talked about the upside, which is economic growth and more exposure to new ideas and perhaps, as you say, more democracy, less control by dictators. Your book actually talks about one of those deficiencies of globalization. You say that you’re...
convinced that more and more ideas and things are being stolen or plagiarized. You begin with a terrific anecdote about how Bill Clinton’s autobiography was stolen in China and rewritten to some extent. Is that something that we really should be worried about? Is it a drain on the resources of countries that more and more are devoted to producing intellectual property?

Naím: That’s a great question. When one thinks about countries and the explosion of the international trade in counterfeits, the examples that come to mind are the very expensive sneakers that you can buy for a fraction of the price if they are counterfeited, or the elegant ladies’ bags, or the DVDs of the movies and music that are constantly copied and used without payment. And then the question is, who is this, in effect, damaging?

But one tends to forget several things. First is that illicit trades are connected, and very often the person that is selling you the elegant bag, the street vendor, is as illicit as the bag that he or she is selling you. He probably was trafficked from another country, and he’s being used and exploited by the networks that traffic in people to peddle these counterfeited items. He’s the equivalent of an indentured servant trying to pay back the debt that he owes to the traffickers.

Very often they are not the happy volunteers, these workers. Very often they have been—in the case of the international trade in women—enticed with the opportunity, with the notion that they’re going to be taken from Eastern Europe to Western Europe to work as domestic workers, and then they are coerced into prostitution and exploited. And that is a huge element of that trade.

Going back to the counterfeiters, we can joke about the watch that costs $5,000 and one buys for $20 in the streets of Manhattan and that’s fine, but there are other things that are counterfeited and they’re very dangerous. There are counterfeit airplane parts that are defective and cause plane crashes. There are counterfeit medicines that, instead of curing, kill. There are all sorts of dimensions associated with these trades that are not as easy to tolerate as watches and handbags.

Glassman: Claude, let’s talk about some of the more popular images of globalization. I just attended the World Trade Organization meeting in Hong Kong and there were some South Korean rice farmers who got a lot of attention for their demonstrations, and their complaint was that if South Korea opens itself up to trade in rice, then we’re going to be out of a job. We can’t do anything but farm rice, they say. We’re not very good at anything else. They’re older people. And rice doesn’t cost that much anyway. So is the rice farmer’s dilemma part of the negative force of globalization, or is it actually ultimately positive?

Barfield: I think all nations are delinquent in dealing with the negative sides of opening up your markets to trade or investment basically because the policies are not very good. Those South Korean farmers, that’s what they’ve done for generations, and nobody has stepped in to try to—except by attrition, which is actually what’s happening in Korea—to try to ease that change, the transition of the adjustment. I think all nations are delinquent. We don’t really have a handle on how you make this adjustment, but there certainly is a moral or a social obligation of the nation that is involved with this, whether it’s Korea or the United States or the British or the Europeans, to step in. And it can be a wrenching situation.

There is another side to this, though. When you get into the anti-globalist movement, there is a lot of sort of romanticism that we should leave these tribes in the upper part of the Amazon or the impoverished farmers in Southern Mexico, that somehow this is a terrible thing that’s happening to them, that Mexico is being opened up. Well, think of the life those people are living. You know, we think about the good old days here—a great agricultural life in the 19th century. But even on our American farms in the Midwest and the South, those were long days, people were not educated—there was drudgery.
And so it’s the transition questions, in terms of public policy, that I think are important. But as the other speaker said, you’re not going to be able to stop it. It’s how do you make the adjustment more socially acceptable, or morally acceptable?

**Glassman:** Do you think that one way to make it acceptable, as some people say, is to have a different pace of taking down of trade barriers for developing countries compared to developed countries?

**Barfield:** The United States and the Europeans and the developed countries said, we just need a decade or decade-and-a-half on textiles and clothing, which are the most protected parts of many economies. So in the early ’90s we said give us that decade. The developing countries are similarly saying, well, give us that extra decade or decade-and-a-half, but the problem you face is nobody does anything.

So I don’t have any problem with giving more time, but it has to be a time certain set as much in concrete as possible. And you have to also keep in mind that—what the developing countries often talk about when they talk about so-called special and differential treatment—is to allow themselves to be plagued by their local monopolies, their inefficient industries, for a longer period. So you’re not really doing them a great favor.

**Glassman:** Besides this illicit trade in counterfeiting, does globalization have a downside?

**Naím:** It has negative consequences, and some of the consequences we are already seeing. There is a generalized sense of uneasiness in the population. You know, a lot of their resistance is the sense that something big is going on—changes that are very, very profound in the way people live, in which companies can survive or not survive. Entire sectors are being redefined. We just heard in this country, the United States, in the last year a very furious debate about outsourcing, about the whole idea of utilizing employees in Asia, in India, to do work that used to be done here, and you could detect a lot of anxiety that went way beyond the job losses. If you measure the job losses with outsourcing, it’s very small. And then the big debate would lead you to think that we’re talking about hundreds of thousands of Americans losing their jobs, and that’s not the case.

So there is a general anxiety about globalization because there is a sense that there are changes going on that are touching all of us, and we don’t know how, at the end of the day, our families, ourselves, our companies, our communities are going to end up being hit or not hit.

**Glassman:** I always had the feeling that globalization is an example of something where the benefits are very widespread, and that the costs are very narrow and they hurt specific industries—the American shoe industry or the Korean rice industry—and those people are yelling and screaming, but you’re talking about something, a more widespread anxiety. Does that have a basis in fact?

**Naím:** The best example is an example you yourself gave of the South Korean rice farmers, because I wonder where the consumers of rice were in those meetings? Of course there is a whole generation of South Korean rice farmers that are going to suffer from what’s happening to the international trade rules in rice. But far more people are going to benefit from the opening of trade and the elimination of subsidies—the trade-distorting subsidies in rice. These are consumers that are not represented there because each one of them is going to benefit in a tiny way, in often an imperceptible way, whereas the Korean farmers are going to be hit right now in a very measurable way. So it’s easier to mobilize them and organize them.

Your point is that, yes, that is happening, but there is something wider. And I think that we are still adjusting our minds to a new world where the traditional ideologies of the past—you know, socialism or Soviet Union-type communism—gave a lot of people anchors on how to think about the world and how to interpret changes, a
world in which you had two superpowers that balanced each other. Now there is only one, and every day we get news of changes that we don’t know how to interpret, from cloning to things brought by the Internet, to the illicit trades, to the war in Iraq, to international suicidal terrorists that are willing to kill and die.

Barfield: But that’s not just true in the closed-off societies; it’s true in the United States, too. We are a society that has traditionally been mobile, accepting new ideas, and [with] much greater capacity to do that and not be worried than other societies. But I do think that looking beyond economics, there is a greater sense now that there are a lot of forces that are out of your control. I’m talking about the individuals; I’m not talking about governments. And it would come from anything from biotechnology through the extraordinary impact of the information revolution.

Young people, I think, accept a lot of this stuff and understand it. They understand how to deal with their cell phones and all the computers, et cetera, but they’re still even more aware of the fact that this is something when the technology is really mind-boggling, even for them.

Glassman: But are things really more out of people’s control than they used to be, or is it that we know more about what’s going on in the world than we used to know? In other words, I’m bringing up again the role of communications, which may have overall beneficial effects but could also produce a lot more anxiety. For example, we’ve seen the number of natural catastrophes is on the rise, but actually a lot of scientists believe that it’s not really on the rise, it’s just that we happen to know what’s going on.

Barfield: I think the combination. People talk—you get these stories in the early to mid-19th century when people first saw a train and it scared the hell out of them. Or you first got a radio and you could get beyond your own county or city in the United States. But I think—I just think it’s the scope of change coming from all directions and from various kinds of disciplines—technology as well as science.

Glassman: Moisés, is there a connection between globalization and the rise in religious fervor—some people call it fundamentalism—that we see not just in the Muslim world but in other religions?

Naím: We see it in the United States. There is no doubt. The results are a movement toward more religiosity and more formalized practice of religion, and even a bigger presence of fundamentalist interpretations of religion in daily life, and even in politics. I think behind your question there is a powerful hypothesis; that, as the world changes, either because of globalization or the information revolution, that as all of the changes you two have discussed touch all of us, people are looking for anchors. What is happening is that predictability has declined. People used to have a sense that their lives could proceed more or less like those of their neighbors and parents. Now the sense is that many things can happen to your lives—many wonderful things but also some very terrible things that will make your life and that of your family not look like the ones of your neighbors or your parents or your brothers or sisters.

So with that sense of uncertainty, of anxiety about where this is going—people need to have something to grab on to, and I think there is a very forceful opportunity to do that through religion. That is in some countries. In other countries religion has replaced the hope for prosperity as a way of thinking. In a lot of the Middle East, as we know, the economic performance, even in countries that are wealthy, is dismal. And if you combine that with the demographics where there are a lot of very young people that essentially have no hope, no hope for better politics or for participating in the public life and the political life of the country, or no hope for really prospering and having more material goods, then religion becomes a very interesting option. It’s often the only option in terms of devoting one’s life to a cause, to an
idea, to a hope, or to a sentiment, a religious fervor.

**Barfield:** The really fascinating thing, though, I think, is the Middle East certainly has to be front and center. I mean, just think about what’s going on. We talked about lives being uprooted and changed. Think about a young person, let’s say in the 1960s or the ’70s or ’80s in China, what they’re saying. Then think of this generation that’s coming along, let’s say teenagers in China now. We have some young people at my institute—young Chinese who are convinced that there will be some form of democracy. These are practical MBA types, they’re not dreamers, and yet that transition is going to be very difficult.

**Glassman:** Let me ask that question, which is almost a cliché, but I’d still love to know the answer: Does globalization—let’s just define it in economic terms as meaning a more open economy, a more market-oriented economy—does that naturally lead to democracy?

**Naím:** I think it’s too soon to tell. We don’t know.

**Glassman:** Not just in China but anywhere?

**Naím:** Anywhere. We don’t know. Remember, we have had waves of globalization throughout history. This is not the first time that the world has experienced a very intense integration of different economies. This one started at great speed in the ’90s. It is, again, the information revolution coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the opening of countries that were closed before. And it’s happening as we speak, and it’s happening at a speed and in ways that we still do not fully comprehend. In some areas globalization is creating better conditions for democracies. In others, globalization is hampering democracy.

**Glassman:** Where is it hampering democracy?

**Naím:** I am thinking of, for example, oil countries where globalization has created very large markets. The price of oil these days is in large part very high because of what’s happening in China and because the global economy is growing quite significantly. That creates a stream of revenue for authoritarian governments, and those very high revenues are inhibitors of economic and democratic reforms.

**Barfield:** I don’t disagree except I think the unfortunate thing for them is they have this one resource, so the forces of globalization don’t hit them as much.

**Glassman:** I think the bigger problem is that one resource is owned and controlled by the government.

**Barfield:** Well, that’s true, but the whole thing is that these oil countries don’t have to scramble as they had to do in Brazil, Argentina, or Chile, for example. This whole question—to go back to your original question, does globalization “naturally” produce democracy?—The answer is no. However, this is a fight that is going on in intellectual circles—that I think Mr. Naím’s book takes on—between realists and so-called liberal internationalists. And we have, at the institute at which I work, those who work in security and diplomacy say that economists, or people who favor globalization keep saying it’s going to lead to democracy. Well, look at the Chinese; it doesn’t seem to have done that. And I agree with that. I do not think there is a natural progression.

However, it is also true that with globalization, and even with the fact that the Chinese government can control the Internet in part, and they control these other information sources, it is just impossible today to control your population in terms of information, in terms of sealing them off, as you could do in Eastern Europe, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and ’60s, or China in the 1960s. And then you realize that the Chinese are also letting their students go all over the world. If you’re an authoritarian at the top, you’ve unleashed...
forces that you will ultimately not be able to control. Whether it will produce democracy, I don’t know, but it is certainly true that it is going to be unsettling for whatever government is in power.

Glassman: Do you agree with that?

Naím: Yes, I fully agree with that. Let’s remember for a second that the majority of mankind today lives in non-democratic regimes. It is normal. A normal human being today is a person that does not eat three meals a day, who does not get information from independent sources, if at all. A third of humanity today doesn’t have a phone and has never made a phone call, and most of humanity doesn’t live in democracies.

The majority of children in the world do not go to school. The majority of people in the world don’t have formal paying jobs.

Barfield: But I think we need to be careful. I think you would have to say that more than any other time in human history, you’ve got people living under some kind of democratic state.

Glassman: I think the number of democracies has actually tripled in the last 30 years, although the majority of people don’t live in democracies, if we count China as a non-democracy, as most people would.

Let’s just talk about where globalization is going. Is this—well, we’ve had periods in history when there was globalization, but it did come to a screeching halt for a fairly long period of time, for at least 40 or 50 years. Is it possible that we’ll see the same thing again? Is globalization here to stay or is it cyclical?

What particularly concerns me is that in the developing world, we’re talking about a lot of people who have really not joined this globalization process. Is there anything that can be done about that?

Barfield: I think if you look at developing countries—forget about what the politicians say and what they will sign to, or the heads of state will sign to in Hong Kong trade talks. Just take East Asia or even Latin America and just go back to the question. They refuse to sign up to treaties that lock in investor rights or investment, but they’ve thrown their borders wide open.

And the other thing to keep in mind is that, in trade terms, the amount of just voluntary opening of markets—forget about the negotiations—is enormous in almost every region except maybe Africa or the Middle East. What Argentina did and what Indonesia has done in investment over the last 20 years is far beyond anything they would put on paper, but it’s happening. In other words, they are convinced. They see that this is the way to go, but they’re very nervous about being hauled before the World Trade Organization or some other international organization and being told you have to do this. They want to be able to throw it open to foreigners, to General Motors, or General Electric, but they don’t want somebody to say that you have to have the same rules that you have in your autonomous company there in Brazil or in Chile or in Mexico.

Glassman: But you’re generally optimistic about the developing world as well as the rest of the world?

Barfield: Yes.

Naím: Again, if you take the definition of globalization and heavily imbue it with trade and investment, then it is true. Trade cycles may go up and down, and we may have a spur of protectionism.

Glassman: By the way, do you think that’s happening right now?

Naím: No. I think that trade is very strong and free. Every year international trade grows, and has been growing
more than global GDP. So, yes, there are all sorts of trade impediments, and there are all sorts of subsidies and distortions, but trade is moving. 

Take a broader definition of globalization that includes not just trade and investment, and you compare it with the 19th century. When the telegraph came, there was this furor of communication around the world. But the telegraph was mostly used by institutions. Instead, the Internet is being used by teenagers that get together with like-minded teenagers across the world. There are all sorts of like-minded groups, interest groups, people that share interests, passions, technologies, hobbies, who get together across borders and create virtual communities that have all sorts of activities and capabilities and develop all sorts of new political dynamics. That is irreversible, because as Mr. Barfield said, you can control the Internet but there are limits to how much you can control it.

So the cat is out of the bag. People are organizing. We have more—this is more individual globalization than we have ever seen in history. The prior waves of globalization were institutional, were commercial, where the central actors were trading companies. Today there is a globalization of individuals, and that is a very important difference.

Moisés Naím

“The Internet is being used by teenagers that get together with like-minded teenagers across the world. There are all sorts of like-minded groups, interest groups, people that share interests, passions, technologies, hobbies, who get together across borders and create virtual communities that have all sorts of activities and capabilities and develop all sorts of new political dynamics.”

Sheffield, England’s newest under-twentysomething indie band, the Arctic Monkeys, exemplify teenagers using the Internet to get together with like-minded teenagers around the world. Together, lead vocalist Alex Turner, bass guitarist Andy Nicholson, drummer Matt Helders, and Jamie Cook on guitar currently hold the British record for fastest-selling debut album after theirs amassed an incredible 360,000 sales in its first week.

Credit this success to their utilization of the Internet. The Arctic Monkeys began distributing free demo CDs in 2003–2004. Their fan base quickly grew once these demos were transferred to the Internet for other like-minded teenagers to download and listen to. Soon fans were traveling great distances to make it to their gigs and surprised the band as they began singing back the words as they were performed.

Some are now hailing the Arctic Monkeys as the first superstars of the iPod age. Whether this is true or not remains to be seen. However, their success does demonstrate how modern technologies, such as the Internet, are bringing together people with similar interests. This accomplishment also enabled the band to extend their global reach by releasing their debut CD in the United States on February 21, 2006.

Arctic Monkeys: England’s First Superstars of the iPod Age

Photograph by Tabatha Fireman / Redferns Music Picture Library

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.
It all started at a 1999 World Trade Organization meeting. An activist protester asked Pietra Rivoli, associate professor of finance at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business, “Who made your T-shirt?” In her quest to find the answer, Rivoli traveled to China, Texas, and Tanzania experiencing firsthand the complexities of the global economy. She tells the story in her book The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines the Markets, Power, and Politics of World Trade. In the following article, she reflects on her experiences and marvels at how trade has the power to pull diverse peoples together.

When I decided to follow my T-shirt around the world, what I wanted most of all was to tell a great story. I didn’t start out trying to prove a point or convey a lesson, though lessons surely emerged from my travels. I just had a sense that this very simple thing had a complicated, fascinating story to tell, a story that could resonate with anyone who gets dressed each morning, and I wanted to tell that story.

I found that all over the world people like to be able to explain things to professors. It must be some kind of perverse thrill. Whether I was at a Texas cotton farm or an African T-shirt stall, people wanted me to understand their place in the global economy, wanted to explain to me how their small microcosm of globalization worked; they wanted me to understand how complicated, how hard, but also how interesting it was to face their challenges each day.

As I traveled around the world doing interviews for the book, I heard a lot of contrary views, opinions about cotton subsidies and trade policy, about China and about job losses. But I didn’t meet any villains. There are no bad guys in my T-shirt’s life story. Every business, every entrepreneur, every politician involved in my T-shirt’s life was just trying to make their way in a competitive market, a market that often changes under their feet.

I wrote this book through tumultuous and often tragic times, through 9/11 and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, through terrorist bombs in Europe and through a bitterly contested election in America. But as I traveled from a Texas cotton farm to a Chinese factory, from Washington bureaucrats to a third-generation used-clothing dealer descended from Jewish immigrants, to Muslim importers in East Africa, I kept marveling at how well everyone got along. While bombs were dropping, these Muslims, Jews, blacks, and whites stayed friends because of my T-shirt. The yarn and cloth and clothing bound them together; world trade bound them together. They had no choice but to keep talking to one another. The little guys got along just fine while the big guys were fighting.

Whatever the debates about trade, it was clear to me after my travels that trade is very clearly an instrument of peace and understanding. I feel privileged that everyone I wrote about is my friend now, and I hope the readers like all of the players in my T-shirt’s life story as much as I do.

I have been teaching in a business school for a long time, so I know how easy it is to bore people with talk of trade deficits, or competition, or unemployment. But everyone loves a good story. Some business professors avoid stories in their teaching and research, concerned that stories lack credibility or intellectual heft. But as long as we do our best to tell
the whole story, not simply anecdotes selected to prove our point, stories can go a long way in helping us to understand the complexities of trade and international business. I hope my T-shirt’s story has done just that.

As a first-time book author, I have had a few “pinch myself” exciting moments since the book was released. The first was when I learned that *Time* was reviewing the book, and the second was when I picked up the phone and found National Public Radio international business correspondent Adam Davidson on the line. He loved the book, he said, and wanted to make an NPR series out of it. And then he gave me the highest compliment for a professor when he said the book had changed the way he thought about globalization, and even how he would report on international business in the future.

The NPR series came together over a month or so, as Adam and I traveled back to many of the places that I had written about, back to Texas cotton farms and Chinese factories. On the radio, we had just 24 minutes to condense my work of five years and travels over thousands of miles, just 24 minutes to tell the biography of this most complicated simple thing. As I listened to the background sounds that Adam recorded for the radio series—tractor noises, sewing machine noises, cotton gin noises, and the creepy silence of a padlocked T-shirt factory in Alabama—I realized that I had never thought about the sounds that globalization makes. If you close your eyes and listen, you can hear it all working.

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Why do some countries enjoy robust economic growth while others do not? Between 1975 and 2003, more than half the countries of the world had annual per-capita GDP growth rates of less than 1 percent. About one-third of all countries actually got poorer. This number would be even greater if one could include data on more than 35 additional countries with institutions too weak to collect reliable statistics.

Economists and development specialists seeking answers are increasingly finding a link to trade. If one looks at the world broadly over the last century, it is hard to find systematic evidence for the benefits of protectionism. Yet examples of ill-conceived protectionist policies abound: U.S. isolationism following the stock market crash of 1929 precipitated the Great Depression; developing countries’ import substitution schemes in the 1960s and 1970s discouraged economic growth; and communism stunted productivity, innovation, and economic freedom. Protectionism provides no sustainable benefits.

On the other hand, trade liberalization is making a significant contribution to economic growth, poverty reduction, and stability around the world. Economic studies confirm that countries with more open economies engage in increased international trade and have higher growth rates than more closed economies. Among developing countries, those with the greatest engagement in international trade had growth rates three times higher than lesser trading countries in the 1990s.

China and India are the two most visible examples of the power of trade liberalization. Thirty years ago, both countries had widespread poverty. They still have essentially the same natural resource bases they had then. And their political systems have remained relatively unchanged over the years. Yet today they both enjoy among the highest economic growth rates in the world. What changed? They opened up their markets to the world, contributing to the greatest, most rapid decline in poverty in global history. The nongovernmental organization Oxfam reported that if Africa, East Asia,
South Asia, and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by 1 percent, the resulting gains in national income could lift 128 million people out of poverty.

The United States is a leader in furthering economic opportunities like these around the world by advancing new and innovative economic policy approaches that link trade, aid, and development.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has emphasized the power of trade and growth to transform societies: “There is perhaps no more important tool for the United States as we think about the spread of stable democracy and liberty than to make use of our economic diplomacy, the benefits of free trade, the benefits of development assistance … .”

**Lowering Trade Barriers**

Through global trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), we are advancing bold proposals to eliminate tariffs, quotas, and trade-distorting subsidies. And we are challenging others to do the same. Much of the strength of the American economy can be attributed to the lowering of trade barriers by the United States and its main trading partners. For goods, average tariff rates dropped from 40 percent around World War II to less than 4 percent today among OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. Lower tariffs encourage competition, innovation, efficient allocation of resources, an exchange of ideas and technology, and foreign investment. Lower tariffs also reduce the production costs of industries and help them compete globally. Developing countries have a unique opportunity to reap the gains of freer trade, as average tariffs in those countries are significantly higher than those in the developed world, and 70 percent of tariffs paid in developing countries are paid on items imported from other developing countries.

Reforming agricultural trade is widely recognized as an important step toward expanding economic development, and opening access to agricultural markets through ongoing WTO negotiations could lift millions out of poverty. According to the World Bank, increased market access would account for 93 percent of the benefits from global agricultural trade reforms. For developing countries, nearly all of the benefit would be from reduction of their own import tariffs.

But trade alone does not automatically lead to growth, jobs, and the reduction of poverty. If countries want to capitalize on freer trade and encourage economic growth, they also need to have in place other sound national policies: good governance, rule of law, strong institutions, sound monetary and macro-economic policies, and a commitment to invest in people. These types of sound policies can be difficult to sustain in the best environments. Yet many developing countries are hamstrung by their own policies that inhibit entrepreneurship. On average in sub-Saharan Africa, it takes more than 63 days to start a business and more than 200 percent of annual per-capita income to register it. In Australia, it’s two days and 1.9 percent. As countries take steps to develop sustainable economies, investors feel more confident to trade with, and invest in, those markets. A business-friendly environment helps to attract more foreign direct investment, contributing to more jobs, revenues, and economic growth.

**The Millennium Challenge Account**

Recognizing this, President Bush proposed a new, innovative development assistance program called the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which administers the Millennium Challenge Account, draws on lessons learned about development over the past 50 years—linking sound economic policies to new trade and investment opportunities. MCC functions as primarily an aid program, but it also helps create an environment that supports the benefits of freer trade.

The United States has also pioneered programs that pair trade capacity-building (TCB) initiatives with trade initiatives and has made TCB an integral part of our global, regional, and bilateral trade agenda—giving
developing nations the tools they need to take advantage of open trade. Indeed, the Office of the United States Trade Representative has created a special office specifically to work on trade capacity-building issues. These efforts have made the United States the largest single-country donor of TCB assistance, providing more than $1.3 billion in 2005 and pledging to double that to $2.7 billion annually by 2010.

America’s innovative approach to linking trade, aid, and development is already delivering real results. The U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Central America marked the first time that TCB was an integral part of FTA negotiations. In one example, the United States helped farmers in El Salvador expand into new markets by improving their marketing techniques, food standards, productivity, and business support services for their crops. Their average income more than doubled. This model has since been used in U.S. FTA negotiations with the Andean countries, Southern Africa Customs Union, Thailand, and others.

The MCC is also advancing this record. Since its establishment in 2004, it has signed assistance programs totaling more than $900 million with five nations: Madagascar, Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, and Georgia. A little more than two years after the announcement of MCA indicators in February 2003, the median number of days to start a business dropped from 61 to 46 in MCA candidate countries. According to World Bank officials, because of MCA’s incentive effect, Paraguay adopted significant policy reforms in 2004 that both improved their MCA score on the “days to start a business” indicator and catalyzed an increase in registration of approximately 20 percent more firms than usual.

Trade liberalization is a key and necessary ingredient to a successful economic growth program. The United States is committed to helping countries prosper economically and to reducing global poverty. And we are at the forefront, working hard with the international community and individual countries to increase those opportunities. Our 135 embassies and consulates around the world are actively engaged in promoting this policy. Many developing countries now recognize the vital link between trade liberalization and economic growth. It is increasingly important that we set in motion programs that support this effort. Working together, we are confident we can increase global economic prosperity as we move forward in the 21st century.
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE
An Interview With Daniel Pink

Q: What is globalization, in your view?

Pink: Globalization is the broad movement among economies and societies and technology that is knitting the world closer together and affecting capital markets, technology, and the exchange of information.

Q: What is making this happen?

Pink: I think it’s a number of things. One of them is certainly the advent of new technology like the Internet, which allows a child in Zambia to find information almost as fast as the head librarian at Cambridge University. It allows people to stay in touch with their native countries more easily; it allows capital to move across the world to the place where it can be used most advantageously. It confers a greater amount of transparency on governments and political institutions than ever before. It erodes trade barriers. When I think of globalization, I think of it being basically about flows: whether the flows of ideas, flows of capital, flows of goods and services, flows of people—all of which have been made easier and have been accelerated because of globalization.

Q: Are we better or worse off as a result?

Pink: We’re better off. In my view, globalization is good, not perfect. And we can’t let perfect be the enemy of good. Globalization in general has lifted living standards...
throughout the world. Now there have been obviously some dislocations from that. If you are an American worker and your manufacturing job goes to a country in the developing world where someone is going to get paid one-fifth of what you're earning, then you have been in some fashion harmed by globalization.

At the same time, that manufacturing worker and his or her family benefit from the lower cost of goods and services because of falling trade barriers. And they benefit obviously from all the technology that helps enable globalization. So my view is that globalization is mostly a plus. And the challenge of public policy, the challenge of political leadership nationally and trans-nationally, is to make sure that people get the benefits of globalization, and that for the downside of globalization, governments and political institutions step in to mitigate its negative effects.

Q: Are there statistics showing that globalization lifts all boats?

Pink: It depends on whose standard of living. Certainly U.S. per capita GDP over the last 50 years has tripled. I am certain living standards in much of the rest of the world have also improved. That said, you've still got more than a billion people on this planet living on less than a dollar a day. So it's not like everybody is living in a land of milk and honey by any long shot, but in general globalization has made things better rather than worse, and in general the present is better than the past. In general, I am almost certain, not because I am a woolly-eyed optimist but because I'm a realist, that the future will be better than the present.

Q: In your book *A Whole New Mind*, you predict that more routine white-collar jobs will flow out of developed nations and into developing ones, and you say that they will be made up for by more creative jobs in America and other developed nations. Yet, this assumes that most people are capable of being highly creative. Suppose most of us are not?

Pink: I disagree with the premise that most people don't have these kinds of abilities. My argument is that economies are automating and off-shoring routine white-collar work—basic accounting, basic financial analysis, even basic legal services—and this is the same sort of pattern that we saw with routine manufacturing work. Today anything that is routine—that is, anything that can be reduced to a script, to a spec sheet, to a set of rules—this kind of work increasingly is going to disappear from the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan, because that kind of work can get done more cheaply by computers and by people overseas.

Now, what that means is that in order to survive in the economy, you have to do something that isn't routine. That tends to be work that is artistic, creative, empathic, about the big picture. And I think that the idea that human beings in general and Americans in particular can't be creative, empathic, big-picture-oriented is flatly wrong.

Illustrating recent developments in the use of technology in medicine, Dr. Arjun Kalyanpur in Bangalore, India, discusses a patient’s scan with an American doctor in Connecticut.

For example, consider the time when America was moving from an agricultural economy to a manufacturing economy, and people said, “Well, everybody can’t go to high school, everybody can’t learn to read and write. A good education is only reserved for a certain elite population.” What I’m talking about here is not that everyone becomes Salvador Dali, but that everybody becomes adept at these sorts of high-concept, high-touch abilities. And I think that is eminently doable.

No one would say, “The masses of men cannot become literate.” Not everybody can become Toni Morrison. But nearly everyone can become literate. “The masses of men can’t become numerate.” Well, I don’t agree with that. I don’t think that everyone can be Albert Einstein, but they can certainly be numerate. And they can go beyond that.
Q: What happens to people in developed nations when people in developing nations of the world become equally well educated and find their own creativity?

Pink: I think that's an excellent point. Tom Friedman deals with this issue in his writing. There are two different schools of thought. One is that China and India are racing us to the bottom. The other one is that they are racing us to the top. Friedman believes—and I agree—that they are racing us to the top, again not because I'm an optimist, but because that's always been the pattern, that's always been the trajectory. Now that doesn't mean that it is 100 percent certain to be the trajectory again, but that's what I would bet on.

And so I agree that Americans have absolutely no monopoly on these kinds of creative abilities, and what we Americans have to do is shake off our complacency and become a lot better at this stuff because, as Tom Friedman says, these other countries are racing us to the top.

Q: The nature of work is changing in other ways. Computers are becoming more complex and capable. How soon would you expect computers to compete with humans for professional-grade work?

Pink: I think in some ways that they are doing certain kinds of professional work. Look at TurboTax [a software program that helps people prepare their taxes]. We have all this concern about off-shoring and outsourcing. There were 3 million U.S. tax returns done in India last year by Indian tax-preparers, but there were 21 million tax returns done by TurboTax. So in some fashion, software already can do certain elements of professional work, and increasingly it's going to do more and more.

What that means is that the accountants who want to survive can't make a living off of doing the same sort of thing that a piece of $39.95 software can do. They have to do things that are harder to reduce to computer code, which is a more sophisticated type of advising—understanding what peoples' financial needs are and giving higher-level financial advice.

It's the same thing to some extent with stockbrokers and investment as well. Nowadays many Americans do their investing on line. Information is widely available, Internet brokerage transactions are cheap because you can execute them on your own computer, and you no longer need a stockbroker on the phone to perform the routine transactions.

At some point that stockbroker is going to try to become a financial adviser, to understand your situation in a more detailed way and offer you kinds of advice that a computer program can never do.

Q: What about robots? How do you expect them to affect available work?

Pink: If you go to a manufacturing floor today, what you see is not the manufacturing floor of the 1920s or even of the 1950s, where you had a bunch of guys in greasy overalls turning wrenches on an assembly line. What you see are people, often with associate's degrees, who are basically running these robots. The robots have no autonomy or will of their own. They answer to software code. So someone has to write the code, someone has to monitor those robots. So this is increasingly what a lot of manufacturing work is. This calls on obviously a much higher level of skill.

Q: Do most of the world's workers have the intelligence, the IQ, to adapt to all of this?

Pink: Let me disagree with the premise of that question, that IQ is a measure of aptitude. IQ is a measure of one particular kind of reasoning, but that is hardly the only form of reasoning, and the evidence is overwhelming that the correlation between IQ and career success is essentially zero. What IQ correlates to is what profession you enter. Also, IQ as measured by standard tests has gone up over time too—the median IQ has increased. IQ is part of what it is to be smart, but it's only a small aspect of it. Look at the work of Dan Goleman in emotional intelligence; look at the work of Howard Gardner at Harvard and his multiple intelligences. I don't put much stake in IQ as a measure of human ability.
Q: Do you feel human dignity is threatened by some of the by-products of globalization? Some argue that bonds of family, clan, community, hierarchy are loosening—that even the dignity of individual achievement based on the development of individual skills means less because roles shift so frequently in a globalized economy.

Pink: That’s an interesting question. If you consider the Western world a harbinger of the future, the family connections here are much more diffuse than in other parts of the world. You have much greater mobility, where people don’t live necessarily where their parents live or where their brothers and sisters live. There is an array of different family forms now that call into question the nuclear family. The point about identity coming from a lifetime of skills is interesting. I think there is a change there, because the half-life of every sort of ability today is shrinking and shrinking. You cannot make a living by plying one trade for 40 years because it doesn’t work that way. The lifespan of a particular set of skills is literally a couple of years. So there’s a premium now obviously on learning and learning how to learn and constantly upgrading.

Now I don’t know whether that erodes human dignity. One could argue that it might enhance it. It allows people to constantly do better, to not fall into stagnation, to have more chance to flower. But, obviously, individual stories differ and the question is a valid one.

Q: In A Whole New Mind, you tend to refer to people as “she.” Do you feel that globalization highlights the role of women? Do you also mean to imply that the androgynous side of the human spirit has some sort of advantage in the new economy?

Pink: There is lots of evidence that people with more androgynous minds that can reason both in a typically “left-brain,” masculine way and a typically “right-brain,” feminine way have a comparative advantage in the modern economy. I think that a lot of the abilities that are often dismissed as “feminine” or “soft”—things like empathy, to some extent even creativity itself—are more valuable nowadays, and that might confer a slight advantage on women. But I think that the future does belong to people with androgynous minds, people who have that analytical capability but people who also have that artistic, empathic ability.

Q: Is that really true? Aren’t most people comfortable with traditional gender attitudes?

Pink: Well, look at the U.S. military, in many ways a macho profession. You have a lot of women serving in the military, and the tasks that today’s soldiers are called on to perform sometimes involve a more sophisticated set of skills. They have to understand local culture; there are peacekeeping missions—keeping the peace is quite different from going directly into combat. In my view, all men have some capability to think androgynously, and those who aren’t willing to develop it might be in trouble.

Q: One of the changes somehow linked to globalization is the widespread use of cell phones, the Internet, even computer games. Are these phenomena, in their playful form, really linked to a globalized economy?
Pink: It's hard to say. But even video games, like any entertainment form, can become a lingua franca that can cross cultures. Even the constant connectedness of cell phones may be related to globalization, though as a somewhat distant cousin.

Q: In your book, you say that globalization seems to have led to an increased search for spirituality in the United States. Why is this?

Pink: There's a huge amount of evidence that above a certain relatively modest level, more money doesn't create all that much more satisfaction and happiness in one's life, and that what ultimately confers satisfaction and happiness are nonmonetary things: satisfying work, close relationships, living a life of meaning. I think that as more people are liberated from the struggle for survival, you're going to have more people who have the luxury of seeking meaning, seeking a sense of purpose, a sense of transcendence.

Look at the work of the Nobel-prize economist Robert William Fogel, talking about “the fourth great awakening.” He talks about how the quest for self-realization has expanded from a tight fraction of the planet to much more of it, especially in the developed world. Others call it “meaning-want”—parts of the planet have gone from “material-want” to “meaning-want.” Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan calls it a move from materialist values to post-materialist values. I think there's a certain luxury that comes from being materially well off that liberates people to seek something more.

Q: In your earlier book, Free Agent Nation, you said that a globalized workforce will consist more and more of people in business for themselves. What did you mean by that?

Pink: I define a free agent as someone who works untethered from a large organization—a free-lancer, a sole proprietor, the operator of a very small business. That form of working is becoming more common because of technology, because of the radically changed social contract between individuals and organizations, because of structural change within organizations themselves, in part because of the search for meaning we were talking about.

Those are the forces that are causing a lot of people to jump the corporate ship and go out on their own, and other people to be pushed. As for the connection of all this to globalization, it's connected to the extent that it gives people more mobility. There are people who do work for North American companies who might live in Europe or in other places overseas. The buyers of talent now have access to a labor market that isn't just local, that is potentially worldwide, even though this is just beginning to develop. As economies evolve, I think you are going to see more and more people around the world seeking to invent their own ways of working rather than latch themselves permanently on to one organization.

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.
IS AMERICAN CULTURE “AMERICAN”?

RICHARD PELLS

Richard Pells is professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of three books: Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years; The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s; and Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II. He is currently at work on From Modernism to the Movies: The Globalization of American Culture in the Twentieth Century. He has held six Fulbright senior lectureships and chairs, as well as other visiting professorships, at universities in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Finland, Brazil, Australia, and Indonesia.

From the beginning of the 20th century, people abroad have been uncomfortable with the global impact of American culture. In 1901, the British writer William Stead published a book called, ominously, The Americanization of the World. The title captured a set of apprehensions—about the disappearance of national languages and traditions, and the obliteration of a country’s unique “identity” under the weight of American habits and states of mind—that persists until today.

More recently, globalization has been the main enemy for academics, journalists, and political activists who loathe what they see as the trend toward cultural uniformity. Still, they usually regard global culture and American culture as synonymous. And they continue to insist that Hollywood, McDonald’s, and Disneyland are eradicating regional and local eccentricities—disseminating images and subliminal messages so beguiling as to drown out competing voices in other lands.

Despite those allegations, the cultural relationship between the United States and the rest of the world over the past 100 years has never been one-sided. On the contrary, the United States was, and continues to be, as much a consumer of foreign intellectual and artistic influences as it has been a shaper of the world’s entertainment and tastes.

In fact, as a nation of immigrants from the 19th to the 21st century, the United States has been a recipient...
as much as an exporter of global culture. Indeed, the influence of immigrants on the United States explains why its culture has been so popular for so long in so many places. American culture has spread throughout the world because it has incorporated foreign styles and ideas. What Americans have done more brilliantly than their competitors overseas is repackage the cultural products we receive from abroad and then retransmit them to the rest of the planet. That is why a global mass culture has come to be identified, however simplistically, with the United States.

Americans, after all, did not invent fast food, amusement parks, or the movies. Before the Big Mac, there were fish and chips. Before Disneyland, there was Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gardens (which Walt Disney used as a prototype for his first theme park in Anaheim, California, a model later re-exported to Tokyo and Paris). And in the first two decades of the 20th century, the two largest exporters of movies around the world were France and Italy.

**The Influence of Modernism**

So, the origins of today’s international entertainment cannot be traced only to P.T. Barnum’s circuses or Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show. The roots of the new global culture lie as well in the European modernist assault, in the early 20th century, on 19th-century literature, music, painting, and architecture—particularly in the modernist refusal to honor the traditional boundaries between high and low culture. Modernism in the arts was improvisational, eclectic, and irreverent. Those traits have also been characteristic of American popular culture.

The artists of the early 20th century also challenged the notion that culture was a means of intellectual or moral improvement. They did so by emphasizing style and craftsmanship at the expense of philosophy, religion, or ideology. They deliberately called attention to language in their novels, to optics in their paintings, to the materials in and function of their architecture, to the structure of music instead of its melodies.

Although modernism was mainly a European affair, it inadvertently accelerated the growth of mass culture in the United States. Surrealism, with its dreamlike associations, easily lent itself to the wordplay and psychological symbolism of advertising, cartoons, and theme parks.

Dadaism ridiculed the snobbery of elite cultural institutions and reinforced an already-existing appetite (especially among the immigrant audiences in the United States) for “low-class,” disreputable nickelodeons and vaudeville shows. Stravinsky’s experiments with unorthodox, atonal music validated the rhythmic innovations of American jazz.

Modernism provided the foundations for a genuinely new culture. But the new culture turned out to be neither modernist nor European. Instead, American artists transformed an avant-garde project into a global phenomenon.

**Pop Culture Potpourri**

It is in popular culture that the reciprocal relationship between America and the rest of the world can best be seen. There are many reasons for the ascendancy of American mass culture. Certainly, the ability of American-based media conglomerates to control the production and distribution of their products has been a major stimulus for the worldwide spread of American entertainment. But the power of American capitalism is not the only, or even the most important, explanation for the global popularity of America’s movies and television shows.

The effectiveness of English as a language of mass
communications has been essential to the acceptance of American culture. Unlike German, Russian, or Chinese, the simpler structure and grammar of English, along with its tendency to use shorter, less abstract words and more concise sentences, are all advantageous for the composers of song lyrics, ad slogans, cartoon captions, newspaper headlines, and movie and TV dialogue. English is thus a language exceptionally well suited to the demands and spread of American mass culture.

Another factor is the international complexion of the American audience. The heterogeneity of America’s population—its regional, ethnic, religious, and racial diversity—forced the media, from the early years of the 20th century, to experiment with messages, images, and story lines that had a broad multicultural appeal. The Hollywood studios, mass-circulation magazines, and the television networks have had to learn how to speak to a variety of groups and classes at home. This has given them the techniques to appeal to an equally diverse audience abroad.

“One important way that the American media have succeeded in transcending internal social divisions, national borders, and language barriers is by mixing up cultural styles. American musicians and composers have followed the example of modernist artists like Picasso and Braque in drawing on elements from high and low culture. Aaron Copland, George Gershwin, and Leonard Bernstein incorporated folk melodies, religious hymns, blues and gospel songs, and jazz into their symphonies, concertos, operas, and ballets. Indeed, an art form as quintessentially American as jazz evolved during the 20th century into an amalgam of African, Caribbean, Latin American, and modernist European music. This blending of forms in America’s mass culture has enhanced its appeal to multiethnic domestic and international audiences by capturing their different experiences and tastes.”

European Influences on Hollywood

Nowhere are foreign influences more unmistakable than in the American movie industry. For better or worse, Hollywood became, in the 20th century, the cultural capital of the modern world. But it was never an exclusively American capital. Like past cultural centers—Florence, Paris, Vienna—Hollywood has functioned as an international community, built by immigrant entrepreneurs and drawing on the talents of actors, directors, writers, cinematographers, editors, composers, and costume and set designers from all over the world.

Moreover, during much of the 20th century, American moviemakers thought of themselves as acolytes, entranced by the superior works of foreign directors. From the 1940s to the mid-1960s, for example, Americans revered auteurs like Ingmar Bergman, Federico Fellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, François Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Akira Kurosawa, and Satyajit Ray.

Nevertheless, it is one of the paradoxes of the European and Asian cinema that its greatest success was in spawning American imitations. By the 1970s, the newest geniuses—Francis Ford Coppola, Martin Scorsese, Robert Altman, Steven Spielberg, Woody Allen—were
The Americans owed their improvisational methods and autobiographical preoccupations to Italian neo-Realism and the French New Wave. But the use of these techniques revolutionized the American cinema, making it even harder for any other continent’s film industry to match the worldwide popularity of American movies.

Still, American directors in every era have emulated foreign artists and filmmakers by paying close attention to the style and formal qualities of a movie, and to the need to tell a story visually. Early 20th-century European painters wanted viewers to recognize that they were looking at lines and color on a canvas rather than at a reproduction of the natural world. Similarly, many American films—from the multiple narrators in *Citizen Kane*, to the split-screen portrait of how two lovers imagine their relationship in *Annie Hall*, to the flashbacks and flash-forwards in *Pulp Fiction*—deliberately remind the audience that it is watching a movie instead of a photographed version of reality. American filmmakers (not only in the movies but on MTV) have been willing to use the most sophisticated techniques of editing and camera work, much of it inspired by foreign directors, to create a modernist collage of images that captures the speed and seductiveness of life in the contemporary world.

Hollywood’s addiction to modernist visual pyrotechnics is especially evident in the largely nonverbal style of many of its contemporary performers. After Marlon Brando’s revolutionary performance in *A Streetcar Named Desire*, on stage in 1947 and in the 1951 screen version, the model of American acting became inarticulateness—a brooding introspection that one doesn’t find in the glib and fast-talking heroes or heroines of the screwball comedies and gangster films of the 1930s.

Brando was trained in the Method, an acting technique originally developed in Stanislavsky’s Moscow Art Theater in pre-Revolutionary Russia. The Method encouraged actors to improvise, to summon up childhood memories and inner feelings, often at the expense of what a playwright or screenwriter intended. Thus, the emotional power of American acting—as exemplified by Brando and his successors—often lay more in what was not said, in the exploration of passions that could not be communicated in words.

The influence of the Method, not only in the United States but also abroad where it was reflected in the acting styles of Jean-Paul Belmondo and Marcello Mastroianni, is a classic example of how a foreign idea, originally meant for the stage, was adapted in postwar America to the movies, and then conveyed to the rest of the world as a paradigm for both cinematic and social behavior. More important, the Method actor’s disregard for language, the reliance on physical mannerisms and even on silence in interpreting a role, has permitted global audiences—even those not well-versed in English—to understand and appreciate what they are watching in American films.

**Human Relationships**

Finally, American culture has imitated not only the modernists’ visual flamboyance, but also their tendency to be apolitical and anti-ideological. The refusal to browbeat...
an audience with a social message has accounted, more than any other factor, for the worldwide popularity of American entertainment. American movies, in particular, have customarily focused on human relationships and private feelings, not on the problems of a particular time and place. They tell tales about romance, intrigue, success, failure, moral conflicts, and survival. The most memorable movies of the 1930s (with the exception of The Grapes of Wrath) were comedies and musicals about mismatched people falling in love, not socially conscious films dealing with issues of poverty and unemployment. Similarly, the finest movies about World War II (like Casablanca) or the Vietnam War (like The Deer Hunter) linger in the mind long after those conflicts have ended because they explore their character's most intimate emotions rather than dwelling on headline events.

Such intensely personal dilemmas are what people everywhere wrestle with. So Europeans, Asians, and Latin Americans flocked to Titanic, as they once did to Gone With the Wind, not because those films celebrated American values, but because people all over the world could see some part of their own lives reflected in the stories of love and loss.

America's mass culture has often been crude and intrusive, as its critics have always complained. But American culture has never felt all that foreign to foreigners. And, at its best, it has transformed what it received from others into a culture everyone, everywhere, could embrace—a culture that is both emotionally and, on occasion, artistically compelling for millions of people throughout the world.

So, despite the current resurgence of anti-Americanism—not only in the Middle East but in Europe and Latin America—it is important to recognize that America’s movies, television shows, and theme parks have been less “imperialistic” than cosmopolitan. In the end, American mass culture has not transformed the world into a replica of the United States. Instead, America’s dependence on foreign cultures has made the United States a replica of the world.

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In the 1981 film The Gods Must Be Crazy, a pilot flying across the Kalahari Desert of Botswana drops an empty Coke bottle into the midst of an African tribe. The natives instantaneously regard the bottle as a gift from their gods. But “the gift” changes the traditions and social mores of their world for the worse. Finally, the natives send a member of the tribe to cast the bottle away over what they believe is the edge of the earth.

This film offers insight into what has come to be known as “The Grand Debate”: Are Americans “cultural imperialists” who conquer and corrupt the rest of the world by spreading popular culture everywhere?

It is true, as Richard Pells writes, that much of what constitutes American popular culture today originated in a mélange of foreign influences during the 20th century. But this does not explain why so many people around the world are critical of what they perceive as “American cultural imperialism.” Nor does it explain why this idea has become such a force over the past century. If we wish to better understand this perception, we need to consider both the makeup and the influence of American culture abroad—as Pells does—and also its reception by non-Americans.

Historical Background

It is a curious paradox in American history that a nation whose cultural transfers became so controversial started out with little interest in the export of culture. Historically, Americans have found their distinctiveness primarily in their political system rather than in their
poets, artists, and novelists. They generally view their popular culture as a source of private entertainment rather than as an instrument of foreign policy. They have never seriously contemplated establishing a department of culture in the federal government. In 1938, the State Department established the Division for Cultural Relations, but many U.S. officials criticized the use of culture as a diplomatic tool. Even today, most Americans believe that culture belongs to the realm of creativity, public taste, and free enterprise, not government.

But following World War II, the situation was different. During the Cold War, American diplomats decided that the United States needed to make the case for the American way of life abroad. At a time when the Soviet Union sought to export communism, public figures as well as policymakers sought to exert more influence through culture around the world. In the years following VE-Day, the U.S. government created a number of organizations and programs, such as the United States Information Agency and the Fulbright exchange program, which promoted the transmission of information on American culture.

From an objective point of view, of course, the United States was not the first nation to export its way of life. Since the Renaissance, European powers have fostered a variety of cultural exchange programs. The British in India and the Middle East, the Germans in Africa, and the French in Indochina all sent their own culture abroad as a powerful tool to strengthen trade, commerce, and political influence and recruit elites for their own purposes. A 1959 study by UNESCO revealed that more than half of the 81 states queried, including all the larger ones, had official cultural relations programs. Some of the European Community’s activities today rest on collective cultural diplomacy—that is, the creation of organizations promoting languages and the exchange of cultural information.

Argentina, Mexico, Egypt, Sweden, and India traditionally export their media to adjacent countries. Moreover, the takeover of Hollywood movie studios in recent years by foreign-based corporations has raised the question of whether Americans have changed from “cultural imperialists” to takeover victims. But even if the United States was not the first nation to export its way of life, foreign critics have consistently focused their fears of the future on the United States.

In the 1970s and ’80s, for example, Western Europe saw rising anti-American protests, peace groups, and mass demonstrations against the American military presence. In Europe, this anti-Americanism soon expanded to cultural matters. Critics believed that American products exerted an influence that went far beyond their popularity among consumers. U.S. goods seemed to dominate not only foreign markets but foreign minds as well. To many European intellectuals, mass culture, Hollywood movies, and commercialism seemingly threatened European sovereignty, traditions, and a social order based on print culture. Mass culture also seemed to blur social distinctions, override nation-state boundaries, and spread the capitalist marketplace.

Yet what Peter tells you about Paul tells you more about Peter than about Paul. What people around the world think about American culture may tell us more about these people than about the United States.

Culture and Globalization

Today, many politicians and cultural critics around the world lament the influx of U.S. movies. European representatives, for example, are concerned about their cultural distinctiveness and fear that they have already lost much of their audience to American products. Under the headline “The Higher the Satellite, the Lower the Culture,” the former French Minister of Culture Jack Lang vehemently condemned U.S. cultural imperialism in a 1991 interview. This criticism was not new. In the 1970s, Chilean professor Armand Mattelart and novelist and critic Ariel Dorfman had written an influential pamphlet titled Para leer al pato Donald (How To Read Donald Duck), which excoriated Hollywood’s distorted vision of reality and advocated liberation by the Chilean people of their own culture.

Tiny nations, remote people, and unknown tribes
find their way into the headlines of international journals through their vocal protest against Western influences. From Iceland to Latin America, Central Africa to the Philippines, representatives reportedly deplore the demise of their cultures with the rising influence of Anglo-American television and culture.

In many ways, however, the idea of “American cultural imperialism” is inadequate. The American sociologist John Tomlinson has argued that this phenomenon may simply be the spread of modernity, a process of the loss of local cultures and not of cultural expansion. Global technological and economic progress and integration simply lessen the importance of national culture. It is, therefore, misleading to place the blame for a worldwide development on any one nation. Instead, all countries are affected by a global cultural change.

In the future, the term “globalization” has the potential to replace the criticism of U.S. cultural imperialism. Globalization refers both to the compression of the world and to the growing perception of the earth as an organic whole. Although many speak of globalization as simply an economic phenomenon, it is multidisciplinary in its causes and its effects. The rather vague term includes many characteristics of modernization, such as the spread of Western capitalism, technology, and scientific rationality. The central idea remains, however, that cultures and societies do not necessarily overlap with the boundaries of the nation-state. In other words, the spread of modern mass culture may not be the responsibility of the United States.

In recent decades, much of the international criticism of “cultural imperialism” has moved away from its anti-American line to a more global level, with no one identifiable enemy. Even major critics of the United States have aligned their earlier reproaches along these lines. Already in 1980, Armand Mattelart warned of the broad and inappropriate usage of the notion of “cultural imperialism.” He emphasized that the term did not imply an external conspiracy but could only be effected by a combination of international and native (elite) forces.

If the concept of U.S. cultural dominance is so questionable, why then has anti-Americanism ballooned nearly everywhere in the past decades and today? The reasons often have less to do with the United States than with the protesters themselves. In a sense, there is no one cultural anti-Americanism but only a variety of very heterogeneous expressions of this phenomenon, conditioned by geographical concerns and historical cycles. The shape and content of the phenomenon not only differ according to dimensions of space but also according to dimensions of time: Each époque and each group has its own forms of anti-Americanism. In the 20th century, much of this criticism focused on the economic aspect of U.S. cultural exports. In the 21st century, it seems, people around the world worry more about the global political implications of American power.

In the Cold War, French anti-Americanism originated in the rift between communism and socialism. Public debates denounced American expansionism, NATO, and what was seen as the corruptive influence of American art, all of which horrified French elites but not the mass of voters. Instead, the “American Way of Life” fascinated a generation of young French in love with consumerism, better living standards, and economic growth.

The French case is instructive because it points to the most fundamental paradox of cultural anti-Americanism: At any point in time this criticism was and is unthinkable without the flipside, philo-Americanism. The tension between the two represents the very condition necessary to support the existence of both: High expectations and bitter disillusion are always joined at the hip.

Still, most powerful states have experienced the basic historical lesson that power generates suspicion, and the more power a dominant nation exerts the more antagonistic other nations turn. In the interwar period and even during the early Cold War years, a number of political and cultural observers grasped this point, and they alerted U.S. policymakers to the consequences of this development. As the United States became a world superpower, it was inevitable that people abroad, in the words of American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, would “hate those who hold power over them”—this is true in both cultural and political terms. When pondering the future of globalization and the role the United States will play in this context, we may wish to remember the words of this wise man.

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BIG AROUND THE WORLD

In today’s globalized world, celebrity is no longer confined to one’s home country. Movie stars, musicians, athletes, designers, and entrepreneurs are among the many groups of people who have “made it big” by sharing the uniqueness of their talent and culture with the global community. The following photo story highlights some of these personalities, many of whom have also used their celebrity to improve the lives of others less fortunate. For example, a well-known humanitarian, Congolese basketball star Dikembe Mutombo, below, donated millions to open the first modern medical facility in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. Mutombo, of the Houston Rockets basketball team, is flanked by teammates Chinese star Yao Ming and American David Wesley. (All images ©AP/WWP)
Irish rock star Bono, the lead singer of U2, plays to the crowd in the first of five sold-out nights at Madison Square Garden in New York City. In 2006, U2 won five Grammy awards, the top award in the American music industry. Besides his musical fame, Bono is internationally known for his work in helping to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa.

Bollywood actress Neha Dhupia and Pakistani actor Moammar Rana pose during promotion of their forthcoming movie Kabhi Pyar Na Karna (Never Fall in Love). India's Bollywood, a word play on Hollywood, is the world's most prolific movie industry, churning out hundreds of movies each year that are watched by hundreds of millions across the world. Many big Bollywood stars, directors, and producers worked together to raise funds for tsunami victims in 2005.

New York Yankees outfielder Hideki Matsui, left, and Seattle Mariners outfielder Ichiro Suzuki have successfully made the transition from playing baseball in Japan to become all-star major league players in the United States. According to mlb.com, 29.2 percent of the major league baseball players on the opening day rosters in 2005 were born outside the United States. These players represented 15 foreign countries, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Renowned director/producer Stephen Spielberg, Malaysian actress Michelle Yeoh, and Japanese actor Ken Watanabe appear at the premier of Memoirs of a Geisha. Yeoh also starred in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Tomorrow Never Dies. Spielberg’s credits include such blockbusters as the Indiana Jones and Jurassic Park series. Watanabe also starred in The Last Samurai.

French Actress Audrey Tautou became an international star with her performance in Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s romantic fable Amélie. She also stars in A Very Long Engagement, a French/American collaboration.

During the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s Brazilian footballer Pelé played in four World Cups with Brazil’s National Team and scored 1,280 goals in a 1,360-game career. He continues as a living legend in Brazil, forever known as the man who took soccer to America. He has also done extensive work for children’s causes through UNICEF.

Jackie Chan’s films frequently combine slapstick humor with high-energy martial arts action. Much like Yeoh, Chan performs his own stunts. His movie credits include New Police Story, Rush Hour, Rush Hour 2, and Shanghai Noon. Jackie Chan is also a UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador, who has contributed $65,000 to help victims of the tsunami.
Singer/actress Björk is arguably Iceland’s most famous pop personality. She was named Best Actress for her role in *Dancer in the Dark* at the Cannes Film Festival in May 2000. The movie also earned her a nomination for best song at the 2001 Academy awards for “I’ve Seen It All.” Björk also performed at the Live 8 Japan concert to promote aid for Africa. Her album *Army of Me* was released as a benefit album for the victims of the Asian tsunami.

Eiji Aonuma is a Japanese designer and director of video games such as the popular Nintendo series *The Legend of Zelda*. The fact that many video games are interactive, entertaining, and tend to appeal to people’s competitive nature contribute to their international popularity. Many offer gamers the option to play alone against the computer, against their friends, or online against other players across the world.

Grammy award winner Maria Rita is the daughter of the late Brazilian vocalist Elis Regina and jazz and pop pianist, arranger, and composer César Camargo Mariano. Her 2003 self-titled debut CD garnered not only critical and popular praise but three Latin Grammy Awards, including best new artist, best MPB (Musica Popular Brasileira) Album, and best Brazilian Song (Portuguese Language). *The New York Times* has called her “the biggest phenomenon to hit Brazilian popular music in years.”
Los Angeles-based System of a Down's music has been described as combining elements of goth and funk with hard-edged music that appeals to younger fans and lyrics that attract the 20-somethings. All of Armenian heritage, two of the band members were born in Lebanon, one in Armenia, and one in California.

Colombian singer Shakira has established herself as an international star with a groundbreaking blend of pop and rock styles. She won a Grammy for Best Female Pop Vocal Performance (“Ojos Asi”) at the inaugural Latin Grammy Awards in 2000. Her superstar status was further cemented the following year when “Laundry Service” broke into the Top 5 of the mainstream U.S. pop charts.

Seiji Horibuchi, founder of Viz Communications and publisher of *Shonen Jump*, stands by a number of comic and animation characters at the entrance to his company’s offices in San Francisco. Japanese animation, toys, and video games are popular around the world because they cut across gender and age boundaries. Japanese “manga” comics and animation known as “anime” are rapidly changing from a niche market to a mass phenomenon in the United States.
Sean Paul’s 1996 release of “Baby Girl” was the first of a series of undeniable reggae smashes that proved that authentic Jamaican dancehall reggae could be embraced as popular music on a global scale. His double-platinum album Dutty Rock sold nearly six million copies worldwide and received numerous prestigious awards, including the Grammy for Best Reggae Album in 2004.

Singer Beyonce Knowles and fashion guru Tommy Hilfiger attend a launch party for a new Hilfiger fragrance. Beyonce, a native of Houston, Texas, is an accomplished composer and sings in French as well as English. The recipient of numerous Grammy awards, she often performs at benefit concerts, such as a 2003 AIDS benefit in South Africa. In a true family enterprise, her father serves as her manager and her mother as costume designer. Originally from Elmira, New York, designer Hilfiger took what started as a men’s jeans and sportswear company to a half-billion-dollar global empire encompassing women’s wear, children’s wear, footwear, eyeglasses, fragrances, and home furnishings.

Gérard Depardieu is arguably the leading actor in France today. He has played roles on stage and screen including Cyrano de Bergerac, the Count of Monte Cristo, Napoleon, and comic character Obélix, and has appeared in American movies such as The Man in the Iron Mask and Green Card. He will also star in Sam Weisman’s Knights of Manhattan, due out in 2006.
GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DEMOCRACY

DANIEL GRISWOLD


When trade and globalization are discussed in the U.S. Congress and in the American media, the focus is almost entirely on the economic impact at home—on manufacturing, jobs, and wages. But trade is about more than exporting soybeans and machine tools. It is also about exporting freedom and democracy.

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has articulated the argument that trade can and must play a role in promoting democracy and human rights in the rest of the world. In an April 2002 speech, President Bush said, “Trade creates the habits of freedom,” and those habits “begin to create the expectations of democracy and demands for better democratic institutions. Societies that are open to commerce across their borders are more open to democracy within their borders.”

TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICAL REFORM

The connection between trade, development, and political reform is not just a throwaway line. In theory and in practice, economic and political freedoms reinforce one another. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Samuel Huntington have noted that economic development and an expanding middle class can provide more fertile ground for democracy.

Trade and globalization can spur political reform by expanding the freedom of people to exercise greater control over their daily lives. In less developed countries, the expansion of markets means they no longer need to bribe or beg government officials for permission to import a television set or spare parts for their tractor. Controls on foreign exchange no longer limit their freedom to travel abroad. They can more easily acquire tools of communication such as mobile phones, Internet access, satellite TV, and fax machines.

As workers and producers, people in more open countries are less dependent on the authorities for their livelihoods. For example, in a more open, market-driven economy, the government can no longer deprive independent newspapers of newsprint if they should displease the ruling authorities. In a more open economy and society, the “CNN effect” of global media and consumer attention exposes and discourages the abuse of workers. Multinational companies have even greater
incentives to offer competitive benefits and wages in more globalized developing countries than in those that are closed.

Economic freedom and rising incomes, in turn, help to nurture a more educated and politically aware middle class. A rising business class and wealthier civil society create leaders and centers of influence outside government. People who are economically free over time want and expect to exercise their political and civil rights as well. In contrast, a government that can seal its citizens off from the rest of the world can more easily control them and deprive them of the resources and information they could use to challenge its authority.

INCREASED DEMOCRATIZATION

As theory would predict, trade, development, and political and civil freedom appear to be tied together in the real world. Everyone can agree that the world is more globalized than it was 30 years ago, but less widely appreciated is the fact that the world is much more democratized than it was 30 years ago. According to the most recent survey by Freedom House, the share of the world's population enjoying full political and civil freedoms has increased substantially in the past three decades, as has the share of the world's governments that are democratic.

In its annual survey, released in December 2005, the human rights research organization reported that 46 percent of the world's population now lives in countries it classifies as “Free,” where citizens “enjoy open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.” That compares to the 35 percent of mankind that enjoyed a similar level of freedom in 1973. The percentage of people in countries that are “Not Free,” where political and civil liberties are systematically oppressed, dropped during the same period from 47 percent to 36 percent. The percentage of the population in countries that are “Partly Free” has remained at 18 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of the world's governments that are democracies has reached 64 percent, the highest in the 33 years of Freedom House surveys.

Thanks in good measure to the liberating winds of globalization, the shift of 11 percentage points of the world's population in the past three decades from “Not Free” to “Free” means that another 650 million human beings today enjoy the kind of civil and political liberties taken for granted in such countries as the United States, Japan, and Belgium, instead of suffering under the kind of tyranny we still see in the most repressive countries.

Within individual countries, economic and political freedoms also appear to be linked. A 2004 study by the Cato Institute, titled “Trading Tyranny for Freedom,” found that countries that are relatively open to the global economy are much more likely to be democracies that respect civil and political liberties than those that are relatively closed. And relatively closed countries are far more likely to deny systematically civil and political liberties than those that are open.

FROM ECONOMIC REFORM TO POLITICAL REFORM

In the past two decades, a number of economies have followed the path of economic and trade reform leading to political reform. South Korea and Taiwan as recently as the 1980s were governed by authoritarian regimes that did not permit much open dissent. Today, after years of expanding trade and rising incomes, both are multiparty democracies with full political and civil liberties. Other countries that have most aggressively followed those twin tracks of reform include Chile, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, and Tanzania.
In other words, governments that grant their citizens a large measure of freedom to engage in international commerce find it increasingly difficult to deprive them of political and civil liberties, while governments that “protect” their citizens behind tariff walls and other barriers to international commerce find it much easier to deny those same liberties. Of course, the correlation between economic openness and political freedom across countries is not perfect, but the broad trends are undeniable.

The application for U.S. foreign policy is that trade and development, along with its economic benefits, can prove to be powerful tools for spreading broader freedoms and democracy around the world.

In mainland China, for example, economic reform and globalization give reason to hope for political reforms. After 25 years of reform and rapid growth, an expanding middle class is experiencing for the first time the independence of home ownership, travel abroad, and cooperation with others in economic enterprise free of government control. The number of telephone lines, mobile phones, and Internet users has risen exponentially in the past decade. Millions of Chinese students and tourists travel abroad each year. That can only be good news for individual freedom in China, and a growing problem for the government.

Free trade and globalization can also play a role in promoting democracy and human rights in the Middle East. In a May 2003 address outlining his plan for a Middle East free trade area, President Bush said, “The Arab world has a great cultural tradition, but is largely missing out on the economic progress of our time. Across the globe, free markets and trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women the habits of liberty.”

Economic stagnation in the Middle East feeds terrorism, not because of poverty but because of a lack of opportunity and hope for a better future, especially among the young. Young people who cannot find meaningful work and who cannot participate in the political process are ripe pickings for religious fanatics and terrorist recruiters. Any effort to encourage greater freedom in the Middle East must include an agenda for promoting economic liberty and openness.

THE FUTURE

On a multilateral level, a successful agreement through the World Trade Organization (WTO) would create a more friendly climate globally for democracy and human rights. Less developed countries, by opening up their own, relatively closed markets and gaining greater access to rich-country markets, could achieve higher rates of growth and develop the expanding middle class that forms the backbone of most democracies. A successful conclusion of the WTO Doha Development Round of trade negotiations that began in 2001 would reinforce the twin trends of globalization and the spread of political and civil liberties that have marked the last 30 years. Failure would delay and frustrate progress on both fronts for millions of people.

For the past three decades, globalization, human rights, and democracy have been marching forward together, haltingly, not always and everywhere in step, but in a way that unmistakably shows they are interconnected. By encouraging globalization in less developed countries, we not only help to raise growth rates and incomes, promote higher standards, and feed, clothe, and house the poor; we also spread political and civil freedoms.

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The Globalization of Crime and Terrorism

Louise Shelley

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At the end of the 20th century, a new phenomenon appeared—the simultaneous globalization of crime, terror, and corruption, an “unholy trinity” that manifests itself all over the world. It can be found in the poorest countries of Latin America and Africa, but also in the heart of prosperous Europe. Facilitated by corruption, crime and terror groups operate together from the tri-border area in Latin America to the regional conflicts of West Africa and the former Soviet Union to the prisons of Western Europe. Crime and terrorism also intersect in Australia, Asia, and North America, as evidenced by criminal cases that document the extensive blending of their activities.

This unholy trinity is more complex, however, than terrorists simply turning to crime to support their activities or merely the increased flow of illicit goods internationally. Rather, it is a distinct phenomenon in which globalized crime networks work with terrorists and both are able to carry out their activities successfully, aided by endemic corruption.

The artificial distinction made between crime and terrorism is based on an antiquated concept of both. The adage that criminals engage in crime for profit and terrorists operate exclusively for political motives belies the contemporary reality of these two groups. Criminals no longer belong to hierarchical organizations that do not threaten the state itself—as was true of the Sicilian Mafia or the Japanese Yakuza. Terrorists, often supported by crime, frequently move between identities as criminals and terrorists. The network structures of both allow them to hook up, conscious or unconscious of each other’s identities: The two groups may work directly together, or they may connect through their facilitators. For example, in Los Angeles, the same language school that provided some of the 9/11 hijackers their visa documents also provided them for the prostitutes of a major trafficking-in-persons ring. In turn, the trafficking ring engaged in stolen identities that could facilitate terrorist activities.
Contrary to the view that all this has come about with globalization, both organized crime and terrorism have historically operated across borders. Already in the 1930s, members of the Italian Mafia in the United States were traveling to Kobe, Japan, and Shanghai, China, for drugs, and members of various U.S. crime gangs took refuge in China to avoid the reach of American law enforcement. Members of the Irish Republican Army found sanctuary in Irish communities abroad, which also provided financial support for the organization in Ireland.

What is new, however, is the speed and frequency of their interactions, and the intensity of cooperation between these two forms of transnational crime.

Both criminals and terrorists have developed transnational networks, dispersing their activities, their planning, and their logistics across several continents, and thereby confounding the state-based legal systems that are used to combat transnational crime in all its permutations. Transnational criminals are major beneficiaries of globalization. Terrorists and criminals move people, money, and commodities through a world where the increasing flows of people, money, and commodities provide excellent cover for their activities. Both terrorists and transnational crime groups have globalized to reach their markets, to perpetuate their acts, and to evade detection.

**The Globalization Connection**

International organized crime has globalized its activities for the same reasons as legitimate multinational corporations. Just as multinational corporations establish branches around the world to take advantage of attractive labor or raw material markets, so do illicit businesses. Furthermore, international businesses, both legitimate and illicit, also establish facilities worldwide for production, marketing, and distribution needs. Illicit enterprises are able to expand geographically to take advantage of these new economic circumstances thanks to the communications and international transportation revolution. Terrorists have also globalized, taking advantage of the ability to recruit internationally, to be close to diaspora communities that can support them logistically and financially, and to have access to more affluent communities.

The end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on the rise of transnational crime. With the end of superpower confrontation, the potential for large-scale conflict has diminished, but since the late 1980s there has been a phenomenal rise in the number of regional struggles. Unfortunately, often the arms and manpower fueling these conflicts are tied to transnational criminal activity through illicit trade in drugs, diamonds, and people. In turn, these conflicts have produced unprecedented numbers of refugees and have damaged the legitimate economies of their regions, which then become fertile recruiting grounds for terrorists or havens for the planning and training of terrorists.

The growth in illicit transnational activities has been aided enormously by the great technological advances of the post-World War II era. The rise in commercial airline traffic, improvements in telecommunications (including telephone, fax, and rapid communications through the Internet), and the growth of international trade have facilitated the ready movement of goods and people. Criminals and terrorists exploit the anonymity of chat rooms on the Internet and other forms of computer-based communications to plan and execute their activities. The terrorists of 9/11 used public-access computers to send messages and buy their airline tickets. Similarly, Colombian drug traffickers use encrypted telecommunications to plan and execute their trade.

Globalization is coupled with an ideology of free markets and free trade and a decline in state intervention. According to globalization advocates, reducing international regulations and barriers to trade and investment will increase trade and development. But these very conditions that promote a globalized environment are crucial to the expansion of crime. Crime groups and terrorists have exploited the enormous decline in regulations, the lessened border controls, and the
resultant greater freedom, to expand their activities across borders and to new regions of the world. These contacts have become more frequent, and the speed at which they occur has accelerated. Whereas the growth of legal trade is regulated by adherence to border control policies, customs officials, and bureaucratic systems, transnational crime groups freely exploit the loopholes of state-based legal systems to extend their reach. They travel to regions where they cannot be extradited, base their operations in countries with ineffective or corrupt law enforcement, and launder their money in countries with bank secrecy or few effective controls. By segmenting their operations, both criminals and terrorists reap the benefits of globalization, while simultaneously reducing their operational risks.

Global trade increased enormously in the second half of the 20th century. Included in the enormous flow of legitimate commodities was an increase in illicit merchandise. Finding the illicit flows within the licit is quite a challenge. A very small percentage of container ships have their cargo checked, thus facilitating the movement of drugs, arms, and contraband. Therefore, drugs can be moved on tuna boats, escaping easy detection, and a honey business can be used to move money and generate profits for al-Qaida.

Recent decades have seen a rise in many forms of globalized crime. The drug trade was the first illicit sector to maximize profits in a globalized world. Criminals received huge profits from dealing in drugs, and many terrorist groups used drug trafficking as an important source of funding. But as the market for drugs became more competitive and the international law enforcement response to it increased, profits were reduced through competition and enhanced risk; many criminals and terrorists consequently exploited other forms of crime facilitated by the global economy. Both criminals and terrorists have subsequently benefited financially from the increase in arms trafficking and trade in people. There has also been an enormous rise in illegal trade in endangered species, hazardous waste, stolen art and antiquities, counterfeiting, and globalized crime connected to credit cards. Organized crime and terrorists exploit all of these activities, sometimes even in tandem.

A major service industry has also developed to serve all forms of transnational criminals. This includes providers of false documents, money launderers, and even high-level professionals who provide legal, financial, and accounting services to both groups. Illustrative of this trend is the fact that Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C., whose legitimate clients had included American presidents and many in the world diplomatic community, was prosecuted for laundering money for the dictator of Equatorial Guinea and for facilitating the transfer of funds to terrorists, resulting in a $25 million fine. This case shows that the activities of criminals and terrorists do not always stay in the shadow economy.
but often intersect with the legitimate economic system.

**WHAT CAN BE DONE?**

There must be a major paradigm shift in the way we approach international security. By adhering to the artificial and obsolete distinctions that criminals are motivated only by profit and terrorists only by political or religious impulses, policymakers, law enforcement, and military strategists are failing to deal effectively with the new phenomenon of transnational crime networks generally.

States and multilateral organizations must move away from the Cold War-era security paradigm that views conflicts between nation-states as the major threat to international security and assumes, therefore, that states are capable of controlling international security. For example, a strategy for controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by merely locking up the materials needed to make them may be brilliantly engineered but fatally flawed, because without addressing the additional threats posed by the pervasiveness of corruption, and the operations of criminal and terrorist networks, states may be creating a false sense of security.

Addressing the intersection of crime, terrorism, and corruption in the global environment also requires addressing the social, political, and economic environment that generates and sustains them. All three evils are linked to profound problems with the economic imbalances among countries, authoritarian governments, and the lack of opportunities in many regions of the world. A viable solution must recognize and deal with the sense of disenfranchisement that motivates much terrorism, especially among Islamic populations. The availability of jobs and means of obtaining a livelihood is crucial for many in the developing world, so that, for example, Afghan and Latin American farmers are not dependent on drug cultivation to support their families.

Crime is often viewed as a peripheral issue to terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, numerous resources have been shifted in the United States and elsewhere from addressing transnational crime to fighting terrorism. This could be a serious mistake for the military, for intelligence communities, and for others.

The need to combat crime is not a peripheral issue, but absolutely central to the fight against terrorism. The terrorists who bombed Madrid trains on March 11, 2004, might have been thwarted if prison authorities had been sensitive to the plotting going on within their facilities.

One example of a successful strategy is found within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), which merges local police efforts with those of federal law enforcement. By combining expert analysis with traditional police work and closely following the criminal activity within its communities, the LAPD has been enormously successful in disrupting potential terrorist activity and the organizations that fund and facilitate terrorism. Working cooperatively and reducing bureaucratic barriers, the police in Los Angeles have been able to combat terrorism without any special legal tools and without violations of legal rights.

If the threat of non-state actors such as transnational criminals and terrorists continues to rise in coming decades, the future will demand greater international cooperation, more harmonized legislation, and increased sharing of intelligence. In implementing a policy against transnational crime and terrorism, we must, nonetheless, respect human rights and avoid measures that will lead to further radicalization and foment terrorism. How we manage this paradigm shift of seeing and treating criminals, terrorists, and corruption as interconnected will determine how successful we are in saving the benefits of globalization from their dangerous misuse in the area of international security.

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During the past 20 years, a surprising number of new infectious diseases have been discovered, some afflicting only one or a few countries, while AIDS has spread inexorably to eventually become a global epidemic and the fourth leading cause of death in the world. Others have also appeared—in all, at least 30 new diseases. Many more may be anticipated because over recent decades, there have been dramatic demographic, technological, and social changes that have markedly altered the potential for disease transmission, and these changes are progressing exponentially.

Of special concern today is the global threat of pandemic avian influenza, a new type of influenza virus that poses a serious threat to every country. The avian influenza threat clearly shows how advances in global technology may help spread diseases, but it also demonstrates how global cooperation may lead to effective countermeasures. Influenza outbreaks normally recur every year throughout the world. Although these are capable of causing severe illness and death in the elderly and those with chronic lung or heart disease, most persons experience little more than fever and respiratory symptoms for a week or so. About every 30 years, however, a new and different strain of influenza has emerged and spread across the world, causing widespread epidemics, known collectively as a pandemic.

The Bird Flu Threat

One of the most serious pandemics occurred in 1918, when a new type of influenza virus arose that proved to be much more lethal than ever before. It resulted in the deaths of at least 50 million persons worldwide. Concerns about the possibility of an equally serious pandemic were reawakened in 1997 when a new, more threatening strain of influenza (now identified as the H5N1 strain of avian influenza) was discovered in Hong Kong. It was exceptionally lethal for poultry, especially chickens, but it
also claimed 18 human victims, of whom six died. Never before had an influenza strain caused such a high human death rate. The cases all occurred among those working with sick chickens.

Fortunately, at that time, the disease did not spread from human to human. Public health authorities quickly destroyed millions of chickens, and the virus seemed to have disappeared. Unfortunately, six years later it reemerged once again in chickens and soon began to spread throughout Southeast Asia. Tens of millions of chickens have died from the disease or have been killed in attempts to control the further spread of the virus. Close to 150 human cases have occurred, almost half of which were fatal. Almost all patients had been in close contact with the sick birds or provided health care to one of the patients.

Wild fowl are now infected and, as a result of migration, the virus has spread to western Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. As the disease continues to spread, there is justifiable concern that, at any time, the virus might change its character and begin to spread from person to person. Because of today’s volume of air passenger traffic, it is certain that it would spread worldwide within weeks.

A vaccine will be needed to protect humans against the disease. However, the vaccine, to be effective, must closely resemble the virus that is capable of spreading from person to person, though that viral strain does not yet exist, as far as scientists know. Thus, an intensive international effort involving laboratories, public health staff, and industry is under way to obtain, as quickly as possible, the virus as soon as it begins to spread from person to person, and to use new approaches in vaccine production that will permit large quantities of vaccine to be produced rapidly.

**The Need for Global Cooperation**

The influenza threat aptly illustrates the need for greater international cooperation to discover and counter disease threats, wherever they may occur. Such cooperation is needed more urgently today than at any time in history. In the microbial world, countless species are continually multiplying at astronomical rates, each species mutating, adapting, and changing to assure its own survival. Inevitably, from time to time, microbes with different characteristics arise, some highly lethal to humans and some with a capacity to grow and to spread readily. In agrarian societies with scattered populations and small towns or villages, new agents had much less of a chance of being transmitted from person to person, and soon they would die out. Even if significant spread of a new disease did occur in one area or country, further dissemination often was curtailed because of the limitations of travel. The ease with which we travel the globe may spread the most threatening diseases, but advances in communications may also serve to facilitate cooperation to find cures—a global health connection.

Today, cases and outbreaks of disease, whatever their cause and wherever they may occur, pose a threat to the health of people throughout the world. No major city in the world is more than 36 hours distant from any other. In 2003, some 642 million international air travelers disembarked at 750 different airports in 135 countries. Once-common border controls and inspections have proved to be of no value in the prevention of disease, as was clearly shown during the 2003 SARS epidemic. More than 35 million passengers were screened with the intent of quarantining those with fever. No cases were found. If travelers had been infected, they were most likely in the silent, incubation phase of illness and could not have been identified, whatever screening measures had been employed. We are now experiencing population movement of a magnitude and speed such as has never before been witnessed.

The likelihood of new microbial agents gaining a foothold is greatly enhanced by the rapid growth of urban populations. As recently as 50 years ago, there were only two cities with populations of more than 7 million persons (New York and London); only 20 percent of the
world's population lived in urban areas. Today, there are 30 cities with populations of more than 7 million, and seven of these, in fact, have populations larger than 15 million. Many such cities are in tropical and subtropical areas where crowding, malnutrition, poor sanitation, and environmental pollution are predominant features. This is fertile soil indeed for establishing a new disease.

Another major influence in disease dissemination is the industrialization and internationalization of food supplies. Only a few decades ago, most foodstuffs were grown locally on small farms and preserved or prepared for commercial use in small establishments, few of which engaged in international trade. If contamination occurred at any point, few persons were affected. With larger-scale food production and processing and the potential for refrigerated and air shipment of food, contamination at any point in the food production chain can result in massive epidemics extending across many countries. A small illustration of this was a severe diarrhea epidemic caused by an organism called shigellosis in August 2004. It resulted from contamination in a United States airline food preparation kitchen. In all, 241 cases were specifically identified, but it was estimated that 9,000 cases had actually occurred on 219 different flights going to 24 states and four foreign countries.

A seldom considered but major factor facilitating the spread of disease is the extensive proliferation of hospitals, especially in countries and areas where economic resources are taxed and professionally trained personnel are sparse. Many such hospitals have no provision for the isolation of contagious patients and little or no equipment to permit adequate sterilization of needles and syringes as well as surgical instruments. Blood-borne diseases may result, and, indeed, this factor has been an important contributor to the spread of AIDS in some nations. At the same time, it is customary in such medical care settings for large numbers of family and friends from villages and towns scattered over a very wide area to visit the patient. In consequence, sudden explosive epidemics of disease extending over a wide area are not uncommon. Recent experience has shown that hospitals have been the primary site for epidemic transmission of measles and hemorrhagic diseases such as those caused by the Lassa, Ebola, and Marburg viruses.

In this global age, the health of every human being on the planet has become relevant to the health of every other. We have yet to fully grasp the implications of this fact, although both AIDS and avian influenza are proving to be important in communicating this message. There is a need to attack infectious disease problems wherever they occur. An epidemic today in the most remote areas of Africa or the Americas, for example, can tomorrow result in cases and perhaps outbreaks almost anywhere else in the world. In practical terms, the May 2005 adoption of updated WHO International Health Regulations is a positive step toward undertaking the shared research and development necessary to deal with disease problems wherever they occur, and in fashioning effective international networks for research and education such that important findings and observations can be more rapidly and effectively transmitted and applied.

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Adapting International Health Regulations to a Smaller World

On May 23, 2005, the World Health Assembly (WHA) approved International Health Regulations to manage public health emergencies of international concern. The new rules are geared to “prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease,” according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The regulations also reflect the changing nature of global diseases since adoption in 1969.

U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, speaking to the WHA on May 16, 2005, said, “Adoption of the revised regulations will be a very effective tool in our efforts to respond to the challenges posed by biological, chemical, and radiological threats to public health, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental.”

According to the WHO, the original International Health Regulations adopted in 1969 were designed to help monitor and control four serious infectious diseases—cholera, plague, yellow fever, and smallpox. The new regulations require states to notify the WHO in the event of all events and diseases that “may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.” States must also report evidence of public health risks outside their territory that may cause international disease spread.

The revised regulations stress broader obligations to build national capacity for routine preventive measures, as well as to detect and respond to public health emergencies of international concern. These routine measures include public health actions at ports, airports, and land borders, and other means of transportation that are used to travel internationally.

As noted by the WHO, the purpose of the International Health Regulations is to ensure the maximum protection of people against the international spread of diseases, while minimizing interference with world travel and trade.

“The existing regulations were written for a very different world from the one we live in today. Air travel was a luxury, and the movement of goods and people around the world was relatively slow,” said Dr. Guenael Rodier, WHO director of communicable disease surveillance and response. “Today, travel and trade have expanded far beyond what was envisaged under the original regulations. The new rules respond to a globalized, 24-hour world in which a disease outbreak in one country can rapidly move around the world.”

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SOURCES:
http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/May/20-582917.html

A couple stands in front of a display of 2,000 candles lighted in memory of the victims of HIV/AIDS in Copenhagen, Denmark, on World AIDS Day.
In the 14 months since a magnitude 9.15 earthquake and tsunami killed more than 200,000 people and displaced millions in a dozen Indian Ocean countries, those nations and their international partners have worked hard to make sure that future natural disasters never again take such a toll. Plans for an early warning system for the region took form at meetings held throughout 2005 in the diverse locales that reflect the many contributing international partners—Japan, France, Hawaii, Australia, and, most recently, India.

In Hyderabad, India—where the second session of UNESCO’s International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) Intergovernmental Coordination Group (ICG) for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System was held—representatives from many Indian Ocean nations met from December 14 to 16. Along with observers and advisers from Germany, Japan, and the United States, participants discussed the technical details of a fledgling system for detecting tsunamis and other natural hazards. The new system is taking shape in Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other countries, where nothing of its kind existed previously.

Since the tsunami occurred, many countries, including the United States, have offered financial and technical support for the complex undertaking. Through the U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System Program, U.S. agencies will spend $16.6 million over two years to help develop early warning capabilities for tsunamis and other hazards in the Indian Ocean and to support the IOC’s lead in developing an international warning system with seismic and ocean data sharing for 16 countries.

Developing such a system takes time, because warning people about imminent tsunamis and other hazards requires an end-to-end system—one that includes hazard and risk assessment for each nation, hazard warnings and preparedness, ocean observations, data management, forecasting, forecast and warning dissemination, capacity building for hazard detection and prediction, population warning and communication, and disaster preparedness. Each component of such a multinational system must be able to communicate within the system and with other systems around the world.

On December 26, 2004, when the Indian Ocean tsunami occurred, such a system existed only in the Pacific Ocean basin, where more than 85 percent of the world’s tsunamis occur. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Hawaii is part of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Weather Service. Before that date, the PTWC served the Pacific Basin as a regional and long-distance tsunami warning center and as a local tsunami warning center for Hawaii. Today it is serving as an interim warning center for the Indian Ocean—in cooperation with the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), which issues bulletins for hazard-related events in the Indian Ocean—and the Caribbean until systems are in place for those regions.

Thanks to a massive international effort, the elements of such a system are coming together in the Indian Ocean. Over the last 12 months, according to UNESCO, 25 Indian Ocean nations have established communications centers that allow them to receive hazard advisories based on seismic information from the PTWC in Hawaii and the JMA in Tokyo.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is establishing
several new seismic monitoring stations at the source zone of the December 2004 tsunami—near the Sunda fault off the island of Sumatra in Indonesia. To do this, the agency is working with the governments of Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, and the Maldives to improve the monitoring, detection, and notification of potential tsunami-generating earthquakes.

Because there is only a 15- to 20-minute warning time between when an earthquake occurs and when waves strike the shores of Indonesia, seismic methods—rather than ocean sensors—are the best way to detect an earthquake there. Up to 60 seismometers are being installed, mainly in Indonesia but also in surrounding countries; the long-term goal is to have more than 100 seismometers in the region. In this effort, the USGS is working with the JMA, the German Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Chinese Earthquake Administration.

Seismic information can tell these national centers that an earthquake of a certain magnitude has occurred in a specific location, but not whether a tsunami is on the way. Deep-ocean tsunami detection instruments are needed to detect a teletsunami—one that is moving across the ocean toward distant coastal areas. No such instruments are operational in the Indian Ocean, but several countries in the region—including India (with help from Germany), Australia, and Malaysia (with help from a commercial company, Fugro, in the Netherlands)—are working to deploy deep-ocean tsunami detection instruments.

Tide gauges can also help determine whether a tsunami threat is real. In the Indian Ocean region, 32 such gauges have been upgraded so they can be used for tsunami detection as part of an international IOC-World Meteorological Organization (WMO) network called the Global Sea Level Observing System for climate, oceanographic, and coastal sea-level research.

Another international system has also been pressed into service for tsunami detection. The Global Telecommunications System is a global network for transmitting meteorological data from weather stations, satellites, and weather prediction centers that has been modified, with help from WMO and NOAA, to carry tsunami-relevant information.

“As we found on December 26 [2004],” says Eddie Bernard, director of NOAA’s Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in Seattle, Washington, “a tsunami can be a global phenomenon, so it’s really important that when someone has a tsunami, the rest of the world knows about it.”

—Cheryl Pellerin, staff writer

U.S. Department of State
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Global influences have affected many aspects of daily life, and hence our strategies for coping. In the 1970s, for example, it was common to rely on government finance to stimulate economic growth. Today private investment outstrips foreign aid and public assistance.

It was once also common to make industrial decisions on the basis of suppliers located nearby who speak one’s own language. Today industrial decisions are made on the basis of worldwide comparative advantage. A computer assembly plant may be located in Nashville, Tennessee; Northern Ireland; or Malaysia; a textile plant in Bangalore, India, or Sonora, Mexico; a farm for winter fruit in Florida, Chile, or Morocco.

Ambitions for Education

Global influences also affect higher education. Today virtually every country has three higher education ambitions. First is a demand for greater levels of access, and in every part of the world access to higher education is rising rapidly. In the late 1960s, there was no nation in Western Europe where the proportion of the age group in higher education (18 to 22) was greater than 8 percent; today there is no nation in Western Europe where the proportion in higher education is lower than 35 percent. Worldwide enrollment is growing between 10 and 15 percent per year, including in middle- and low-income countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The result: There are few parts of the world where higher education constitutes “elite” education, that is, where it reaches less than 15 percent of the age cohort. Higher education has become “mass education.” Enrollment at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is 269,000; the University of Delhi has 309,000 students; Anatolian University (Turkey) has over one million; and enrollment at what may be the world’s largest private university, the Islamic Azad University in Iran, with its 145 campuses, is 850,000 students. The traditional image we may have of higher education institutions as cloistered retreats from the world educating a select few may have to change. The fact is that higher education today is often impersonal—long lines to enter antiquated lecture halls, libraries with many missing books, cracking walls, falling paint, leaky faucets.

The second ambition in every country is to improve the quality of higher education. Over the last decade there has been a revolution in the criteria that help define
Higher education quality. High-quality higher education now requires electronic modernity in classrooms, dorms, libraries, science laboratories, study halls. Students are often older, work part time, and live far away from the campus. High-quality syllabi are no longer based on textbooks but on the most up-to-date information from print and electronic sources. Information for students is scanned and available online. Students have access to curricular information wherever they live or travel.

What’s more, classroom instruction has changed. Class time is no longer devoted to providing information for students; instead it is devoted to the analysis of information absorbed prior to class. The Internet and other forms of electronic information have changed the academic library and enhanced its quality. There is less need for faculty or students to visit the physical place. A high-quality academic library used to be defined by the quantity of its holdings. Today it is defined by the quantity of its access to information. The difference is enormous. Every high-quality academic library has enough money to join exclusive “information networks” where holdings are shared with one another.

Networks of academic libraries are transnational, and cover university libraries in Europe, Asia, and North America. Access to information is what separates the excellent libraries from the mediocre. All academic services, both teaching and bibliographic, are delivered through broadband facilities. Rankings of universities, in fact, now include the size of a university’s bandwidth (see accompanying chart). Universities with low bandwidth cannot compete in quality with universities with large bandwidth.

A third common ambition of universities worldwide is to improve equity, that is, to offer scholarships and fellowships to the able students from impoverished families or disadvantaged regions. Many first-class universities will have enough resources to offer scholarships to about one student in three, over and above what may be available through public resources.

**Financial Resources**

But all three ambitions, taken together, are expensive, and there are few countries where all three can be financed out of public resources alone. With the increase in student numbers and rising expectations for quality and equity, public resources are insufficient. The scarcity of public resources is likely to be permanent, and this poses a global dilemma: How can higher education successfully finance its own objectives, including its traditional objectives for serving the public good?

This dilemma pertains to both public and private institutions. Public universities in the United States, for instance, now receive only 15 to 20 percent of their recurrent budgets from the state legislatures; the university itself is responsible for raising the remainder, hence making high-quality public and private universities similar

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**Ranking of Asian Universities by Size of Bandwidth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Multi-Disciplinary Schools</th>
<th>Bandwidth per Student (kbps)</th>
<th>Overall Rank 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen University (Taiwan)</td>
<td>33.53</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kyungpook National University (S. Korea)</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chungnam National University (S. Korea)</td>
<td>20.84</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Taiwan Normal University</td>
<td>19.02</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Seoul National University (S. Korea)</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tsing Hua University (Taiwan)</td>
<td>14.77</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kyoto University (Japan)</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chonnam National University (S. Korea)</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tohoku University (Japan)</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tianjin University (China)</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Xi’an Jiaotong University (China)</td>
<td>10.81</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>University of Wollongong (Australia)</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>University of Adelaide (Australia)</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nagoya University (Japan)</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Central University (Taiwan)</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>University of Melbourne (Australia)</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Kasetsart University (Thailand)</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chao Toung University (Taiwan)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: http://www.asiaweek.com
in their management objectives and strategies. So far as I am aware, all universities have four categories of choices to which they can turn for funding:

- They can raise revenue from traditional sources (such as by raising fees, charging rent for facilities, and increasing overheads);
- They can diversify into new sources of revenue (such as by establishing copyrights on inventions or investing in equity markets);
- They can allocate current resources more efficiently (for instance, by shifting from line item to block funding, differentiating faculty salaries and so forth); or
- They can eliminate programs or services that are outdated (e.g., domestic science).

All the choices are controversial. High-quality universities are not only successful at raising resources, but are wise in the reallocation of the resources they raise to help preserve their public-good function. Different institutions differ, of course, in how successful they are in financing their own objectives. Some are slow because they may not yet recognize that to be of high quality, all universities now have to take finance and management into their own hands.

Some might see this trend as a “commercialization” of higher education. Others may see it as the globalization of an “American model” of higher education. I see this necessity for maximizing resources differently. I would characterize this not as commercialization but as the professionalization of higher education in its legitimate pursuit of excellence, and not as an American model but as the successful model in which all higher education must participate in order to address what is now a universal dilemma of public resource scarcity.

**Social Cohesion**

There is one other global influence on higher education that deserves to be mentioned, and that is the way in which higher education contributes to (or hinders) a nation’s social cohesion. Both private and public higher education have roles to play in helping to ensure that citizens live at peace with each other and with their neighbors, and that their graduates are technically able to perform in the labor market up to expectations.

Whether the primary purpose is for teaching, research, or vocational preparation, all universities attempt to influence a community’s social cohesion through two mechanisms. One mechanism is through their curriculum and professionalism in teaching history, culture, biology, physics, engineering, and ecology. High-quality universities are defined by their openness to the world’s literature and evidence, provided freely to all students on as many topics as feasible. No great university restricts access to information.

The second way is the manner by which a university models good behavior and exhibits professional standards. This includes the degree to which a university rewards academic performance honestly and fairly, the degree to which its faculty and administration openly advertise and adhere to codes of conduct, and the degree to which open discussion is cherished and differing opinions respected. The more a university exhibits these characteristics the more likely will its students exhibit human capital through their knowledge and skills and the more they will contribute to social capital, the kind that generates willingness to sacrifice for a common good, as well as tolerance and understanding of other views and opinions.

Universities that exhibit a very high degree of human and social capital are of higher quality, and it is
high-quality universities that will have the most positive impact on a nation’s social cohesion. What this implies is that universities where corruption occurs, where grades and admission decisions and accreditation itself can be changed through bribes, will threaten a nation’s social cohesion. Instead of modeling good behavior, a corrupt university would model the opposite, behavior that is dysfunctional to the nation’s future.

Fighting higher education corruption is a global problem today, and the stakes are high. The Bologna process, through which members of the European Union are working to harmonize their higher education systems to allow for increased mobility of students and staff, and the new UNESCO accreditation guidelines hold out an opportunity for universities in different parts of the world to be compared in terms of program quality. The willingness of a high-quality university to be compared to others often seems to depend on whether a university can demonstrate that it is not corrupt.

The burden of proof is on the university undergoing scrutiny. If it cannot prove its own honesty, its students will be at a permanent disadvantage in the labor market, and the public may well ask to what extent public investment has been well spent.

In sum, there is increasingly a successful “model” of higher education that applies in all regions of the world, and that is the model in which higher education institutions themselves are able to finance their own objectives. It is increasingly clear that higher education has a unique role to play in a nation’s social cohesion, but it can play either a negative role by modeling unprofessional behavior, or a positive role by living up to international standards of conduct.

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Additional Readings on Globalization


CULTURE


http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/fate-of-culture.PDF


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# INTERNET RESOURCES

Selected Web Sites on Globalization

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

- U.S. Agency for International Development  
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  
  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
  [http://www.cdc.gov](http://www.cdc.gov)
- U.S. Department of State  
  [http://www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)
- U.S. Treasury Department  
  Office of Foreign Assets Control  

## INTERNATIONAL

- International Labor Organization  
  [http://www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org)
- International Monetary Fund  
- Japan Center for International Exchange  
  [http://www.jcie.or.jp](http://www.jcie.or.jp)
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
  Principles of Corporate Governance  
- Statistics Canada  
- World Bank Group  
- World Health Organization  
  [http://www.who.org](http://www.who.org)
- World Trade Organization  
  [http://www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org)

## UNIVERSITIES, COLLEGES, AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS

- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation  
  [http://www.gatesfoundation.org](http://www.gatesfoundation.org)
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
  Global Policy Program  
- Center for Strategic and International Studies  
  Globalization101.org  
  [http://www.globalization101.org/about/](http://www.globalization101.org/about/)
- George Washington University  
  Center for the Study of Globalization  
- The Globalization Website (Emory University)  
  [http://www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/about.html](http://www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/about.html)
- International Forum on Globalization  
  [http://www.ifg.org](http://www.ifg.org)
- World Economic Forum  
  [http://www.weforum.org](http://www.weforum.org)

## OTHER

- A. T. Kearney: Globalization Index 2005  
- Global Scenario Group  
  [http://www.gsg.org](http://www.gsg.org)
- International Women's Tribune Centre  
  [http://www.irc.nl/page/7049](http://www.irc.nl/page/7049)
- A World Connected  

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